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Abstract
Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral 
relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five 
years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern 
dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having 
become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their 
concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian 
representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions 
of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the 
terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in 
EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to 
the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was 
the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it 
is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow 
officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere 
of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, 
they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which 
the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the 
Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood 
not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have 
been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies 
conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) 
confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, 
liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are 
contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s 
‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity 
to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an 
instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign 
policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States 
and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to 
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produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is 
nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage 
that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. 
However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow 
towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much 
would depend on Russia’s internal development.
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Résumé
En 2004, la Russie a décliné poliment l’invitation à participer à la Politi-
que Européenne de Voisinage, préférant poursuivre ses relations bilaté-
rales avec l’UE dans le cadre du « partenariat stratégique ». Cinq ans plus 
tard, le gouvernement a d’abord réagi avec inquiétude face à la dimension 
orientale de la PEV, le Partenariat Oriental. Néanmoins, après avoir acquis 
rapidement la certitude de la faible envergure du projet, son inquiétude a 
cédé la place à l’indifférence et la dérision.  En effet, la classe politique rus-
se n’a pas soutenu la notion – idéaliste ou romantique – de communauté 
pour la région entre l’UE et a Russie, a rejeté la terminologie de « Voisi-
nage Européen Commun» et l’a remplacée dans les documents conjoints 
par la référence neutre de « régions adjacentes à l’UE et aux frontières rus-
ses ». À l’intérieur, le terme d’« étranger proche » désignait officiellement 
la région sous l’ère Yeltsin ; il est toujours utilisé aujourd’hui, officieuse-
ment.  Comme le suggèrent ces contorsions terminologiques, les représen-
tants de Moscou considèrent les voisins orientaux de l’Union Européenne 
comme partie intégrante de la sphère d’influence et d’intérêts Russe. En 
dépit de l’assurance du contraire, la relation UE – Russie constitue pour 
cette dernière un « jeu à somme nulle » dans lequel les gains d’une partie 
sont les pertes de l’autre. Les tentatives de l’UE sont restées vaines quand 
elle a voulu convaincre l’élite russe au pouvoir d’envisager la coopération 
dans le voisinage commun non comme une compétition mais comme un 
jeu « gagnant – gagnant », offrant des opportunités aux deux clans. En 
fait, tant les approches conceptuelles que les initiatives plus concrètes me-
nées vis-à-vis des trois pays occidentaux de la CEI (Biélorussie, Ukraine et 
Moldavie) et du Sud-Caucase (Géorgie, Arménie et Azerbaïdjan) confir-
ment que, du point de vue de Moscou, les processus de démocratisation, 
la libéralisation et l’intégration avec les institutions occidentales dans cet-
te région sont contraires aux intérêts de la Russie. Ainsi, à chaque fois, les 
conflits gelés dans la région n’ont pas été considérés par le Kremlin comme 
une opportunité pour promouvoir la stabilité et la prospérité dans les pays 
concernés mais comme un instrument servant à détourner leur politique 
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intérieure et extérieure du choix de l’Europe. L’actuelle « réinitialisation » 
des relations de la Russie avec les Etats-Unis, d’une part, et avec l’Euro-
pe et le « modernization partnership », d’autre part, ont échoué jusqu’ici 
à produire un impact sur les politiques de la Russie dans son voisinage. 
L’UE a néanmoins tout intérêt à poursuivre cette dynamique, à engager la 
Russie dans un dialogue constructif, en y incluant son voisinage. Toute-
fois, son influence reste faible.  Si d’éventuelles réorientations dans les po-
litiques de Moscou venaient à croiser le modèle de celles souhaitées par 
l’UE, cette rencontre résulterait sans doute d’un choix stratégique inter-
ne de la Russie. 
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Introduction
In EU Commission and Council communications, the relationship 
between the European Union and Russia is defined, in capital letters, 
as a ‘Strategic Partnership’. In practice, however, the examples of where 
the two entities act as ‘partners’ are few and far between, and to call the 
relationship ‘strategic’ is certainly wide of the mark as this would require 
agreement upon common goals and values, joint action plans or road 
maps to achieve common objectives and a common understanding as to 
the instruments to be used in order to achieve the stated aims.1 In reality, 
EU-Russia relations contain more competitive than cooperative elements, 
and this applies in particular to EU and Russian perceptions, interests and 
policies in the common European neighbourhood or, as the two actors 
blandly and soberly have labelled it, the ‘regions adjacent to the EU and 
Russian borders.’2 
One of many indications of this state of affairs is the fact that Russia 
rejected the EU’s offer to be a partner of ENP; that it angrily reacted to 
the eastern dimension of ENP, the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP); and 
1 The differences in goals and values will be analysed below. As for action plans and 
road maps as inalienable conditions for a strategy, the term ‘road map’, as used in 
the documents on the EU-Russia ‘common spaces’, appears to satisfy the definition. 
However, the appearance does not square with reality: One searches in vain for a 
hierarchy of aims with well defined priorities as well as instruments and time frames 
for their achievement. What one finds instead are a plethora of ‘actions’ which are to 
serve in the implementation of ‘objectives’ which are often extremely vague; see the 
pertinent analysis by Michael Emerson, ‘EU-Russia Four Common Spaces and the 
Proliferation of the Fuzzy’, CEPS Policy Brief (Centre for European Policy Studies), 
No. 71 (May 2005).
2 ‘Regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’ is the terminology used, for 
instance, in the Road Map and Common Space of External Security. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/road_maps_en.pdf 
(accessed on 5.1.2011). The terms ‘Common Neighbourhood’ and ‘Common 
European Neighbourhood’ do not occur in the document. Geographically, this area 
comprises, in East Central and South East Europe, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, as 
well as, in the southern Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; politically, this 
is the target area of the eastern dimension of the EU’s ENP.
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that it then, in a more detached mood, shunned the invitation by the Polish 
government to become one of the ‘friends’ of EaP. Another indication is 
terminology. Whereas, in EU parlance, the EaP area is regarded as part of 
a ‘Wider Europe’, meaning that the values, norms, regulatory procedures 
and processes of integration up to and including major provisions of the 
acquis communautaire are to be extended to that part of Europe, Russian 
officials consider the countries of this area in terms of their previous status 
of former Union Republics of the USSR; put the emphasis explicitly on 
this region as being part of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(‘CIS area’); and implicitly regard it as Russia’s exclusive ‘Near Abroad’ 
(blizhznoe zarubezhe).3 Moscow, furthermore, has attempted to counteract 
EU integration attempts in the area by integrative constructs of its own, 
ranging from the Russia-Belarus constitutional ‘Union’ via the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EURASEC) to the military-political Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). 
The present analysis seeks to explain the reasons for the prevalence of 
competitive elements in the EU-Russian relationship, the resulting Russian 
aloofness from ENP and opposition to EaP. The main propositions and 
hypotheses of explanation are as follows: 
Russia does •	 not frame policies in its European neighbourhood in 
response to the ENP or EaP but, first and foremost, as an extension 
3 The term of ‘Near Abroad’ is hardly being used any more but it took a long time to 
whither away. As early as january 1998, two high-ranking officials of the Russian 
government responsible for relations with CIS member countries states, deputy 
foreign minister Valery Serov and the minister for CIS cooperation, Anatoly 
Adamishin, stated that the term should no longer be used as it were incompatible 
with establishing ‘normal’ relations with the post-Soviet countries and treating them 
as ‘equal members of the world community’. Serov und Adamishin in separate TV 
appearances on the then still independent NTV channel and the ‘Vesti’ programme 
of RTV on 21 january 1998, as quoted in: ‘Good Bye “Near Abroad”’, Monitor 
(jamestown Foundation), Vol. 4, No. 14, 22 january 1998. Available at: http://
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache= 1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=13599&tx_
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=212 (accessed on 5.1.2011).
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of domestic politics and, second, in response to challenges it perceives 
emanating from ‘the West’ in general, that is, from the United States in 
Europe, NATO, the EU, its Member States, and European countries that 
are not members of the EU. 
Russian policy makers do not regard the area between Russia and the EU as a •	
‘region’ beyond its geographical connotation but as politically, economically, 
socially and culturally quite differentiated, and it is presumably also for this 
reason that they do not pursue a comprehensive, conceptually consistent 
policy. Their approach does not follow some blueprint or geopolitical 
construct. It is, instead, opportunistic and reactive. Without abandoning 
projects of multilateral integration, it puts the emphasis on bilateralism. 
The common denominator of the approach, however, is the consideration 
of the post-Soviet space as a Russian sphere of influence.
Russia, under president and then prime minister Putin, and despite •	
recurrent professions to the contrary, has moved away from European 
values; embarked upon a course to achieve ill-defined ‘Great Power’ 
(velikaya derzhava) status; and resurrected perceptions and policies of 
the Soviet era without, however, carrying its ideological baggage. This 
development is of supreme importance because (as mentioned above) 
Kremlin officials perceive policies in their near neighbourhood as an 
extension of Russian domestic ordering principles, as wedged between 
domestic politics and foreign policy. 
As a consequence, the EU’s activities on post-Soviet space are seen in •	
Moscow in geopolitical terms, as a struggle over spheres of influence 
where ‘power vacuums’ cannot exist for long and attention needs to be 
paid to the ‘balance of power’. To put it in political science language, 
contrary to more recent assertions, Kremlin officials perceive EU-
Russian relations in the common neighbourhood as a zero-sum game, 
where the gain of one side is the loss of the other.
The main instruments of Russia’s policies in its European neighbourhood •	
are wielded in the form of the two ‘hard power’ attributes: regional 
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military preponderance, and oil and gas resources. Whereas the former 
is a means of last resort and applied only in exceptional circumstances 
(e.g. the war in Georgia), the latter is used extensively and systematically. 
This justifies characterisation of Russian policies in its neighbourhood 
(and beyond) as ‘economisation’. The label, however, neither implies 
precedence of economics over politics nor does it mean liberal laisser 
faire but the very opposite, namely, government control and management 
of economic affairs, in short, politisation and use of economic levers in 
relation to the neighbouring countries to achieve political objectives. 
In any case, it would be analytically erroneous to separate Russian 
commercial and political interests in the near neighbourhood. 
The tools of Russian policy, however, have not been limited to oil, gas •	
and electricity. They also come in the form of ‘soft power’ such as cultural 
means and the use of Russian ethnic minorities and ethnically non-
Russian but culturally assimilated people (russko-yazychnie) in the new 
independent states for the promotion of Russian interests.
In order to verify or falsify these hypotheses, evidence about Moscow’s 
perceptions of and policies towards the whole western and southern 
CIS area – the region ‘in between’ Russia and the EU, the countries 
participating in one form or another in ENP – will be provided first. This 
will be followed by more specific examination of the Kremlin’s approaches 
and policies towards each of the six countries of that area. The findings will 
be summarized in the next part. The final part deals with prospects for 
change in Russian attitudes and practice as a consequence of the president 
Medvedev’s drive for ‘modernisation’ of the country and the EU-Russia 
‘modernisation partnership’.
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Russian Spheres of Influence  
versus European Common Spaces
Russian perceptions of the post-Soviet space as being a Russian sphere of 
influence essentially have not changed since the Yeltsin era. Corresponding 
policies have varied over time but their essence has remained constant. 
The consistency has ranged from Yeltsin’s declaration that ‘policy 
considerations in relation to other CIS countries have priority’4 through 
Putin’s view that the collapse of the USSR constituted ‘a national tragedy 
of immense proportions’5 and ‘the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
20th century’6 and his successor’s reiteration that Russia had ‘privileged 
interests’ in its border regions7 to the reminder by the current foreign 
minister, Sergey Lavrov, that Russia had special relations with eastern 
European countries because of ‘hundreds of years of common history’ and 
his incensed question whether the Eastern Partnership wasn’t a (blatant 
and unacceptable) ‘attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence’.8 
In detail, president Yeltsin’s foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, had 
conducted policies under the label of ‘Euroatlantic community from 
4 Yeltsin in a speech to Russian foreign ministry officials, as quoted by Interfax (in 
Russian), 28 October 1992.
5 Putin in a speech on 12 February 2004 to about 500 journalists at the beginning of 
his campaign for the March 2004 presidential elections. ‘Putin schitaet raspad SSSR 
obshchenatsional’noy tragediey’, Nasledie otechestva, 12 February 2004. 
6 Putin in his state-of-the-nation address on 25 April 2005. ‘Poslanie Federal’nomu 
Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, 25 April 2005. Homepage of the President of the 
Russian Federation. Available at: www.kremlin.ru/sdocs/appears.shtml (accessed on 
10.1. 2011). In line with the professed concern for the Russian minorities on post-Soviet 
space, Putin clarified what he meant by the ‘tragedy’: ‘For the Russian people, it became 
a real drama. Tens of millions of our citizens and countrymen found themselves outside 
Russian territory. The epidemic of disintegration also spread to Russia itself.’
7 Medvedev in a TV interview broadcast by Channel One, Rossiya and NTV on 31 
August 2008. Available at: http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/warfare/
statement310808en.htm (accessed on 17.1.2011).
8 Lavrov on 21 March 2009; see ‘EU Expanding its “Sphere of Influence”, Russia Says.’ 
Available at: http://euobserver.com/9/27827 (accessed on 10.1. 2011).
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Vancouver to Vladivostok’ but as early as autumn 1992 this approach 
had come under attack from a combination of communist, nationalist 
and neo-imperialist politicians and ideologues. They rejected the idea of 
integration in a common Euroatlantic space, claiming instead that Russia 
had a separate – ‘Eurasian’ – identity and ‘special rights’ in that geopolitical 
space. The president responded to such assertions. 
In February 1993, Yeltsin stated that Russia ‘continues to have a vital interest in 
the cessation of all armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR’, adding 
that ‘the moment has come when responsible international organizations, 
including the United Nations, should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor 
of peace and stability in the region of the former Union’.9 In September 1995, 
he claimed ‘the territory of the CIS’ as a region of ‘fundamental and vital 
interests’ for Russia and held Russia to be the ‘leading power in the emergence 
of a new system of interstate and economic relations on post-Soviet territory’.10 
Such demands were justified by the alleged need to ‘protect the rights’ of the 
25 million ethnic Russians (according to the 1989 and last Soviet census) living 
outside the Russian Federation. The foreign ministry, however, included in 
the category of Russian compatriots ethnically non-Russian but culturally 
assimilated citizens in the new independent states, ‘Russian speaking’ people, 
thereby increasing the number of persons eligible for Russian ‘protection’ to 30 
million.11 The presence of ethnic Russians, and ‘Russian speaking’ population 
as well as ethnically non-Russians holding Russian Federation passports 
outside Russia, as the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 demonstrated, has 
provided Moscow with an instrument for the assertion of larger foreign policy 
and strategic objectives, including the reestablishment of a greater degree of 
political control in the area covered by the former USSR.
  9 Yeltsin in a speech to a congress of the Civic Union, a center-right alliance, in late 
February 1993; ITAR-TASS (in Russian), 1 March 1993.
10 In a presidential decree, as quoted by Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 September 1995, p. 4.
11 See, for instance, the Russian foreign ministry’s Programme for the Protection of 30 
Million Russians in the Near Abroad; ‘Moskva razrabotala programmu za zashchitu 
30 millionov russkikh v blizhnem zarubezh’e’, Izvestiya, 17 February 1994, p. 1.
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As for relations with the then European Communities, the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement signed in june 1994 in Corfu was to a large extent 
still wedded to Kozyrev’s Euroatlantic approach. Economic and trade 
issues were central in that document but also political matters occupied 
some space. In that document, Russia agreed that ‘the full implementation 
of partnership presupposes the continuation and accomplishment of 
Russia’s political and economic reforms’ and also that the ‘Parties [would] 
endeavour to cooperate on matters pertaining to the observance of the 
principles of democracy and human rights’. Russian diplomats only 
managed to assert some of Russia’s proclaimed special interests’ and only 
in a cryptic and hence innocuous form. This is indicated, for instance, in 
the formulation that ‘paramount importance [had to be attached to] the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly those of minorities, the 
establishment of a multi-party system with free and democratic elections 
and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market economy’.12 The 
‘minorities’ Russian negotiators had in mind were obviously Russian in 
the Near Abroad. In an equally harmless way, they gained EC consent to 
the wording that the signatories to the PCA were ‘desirous of encouraging 
the process of regional cooperation in the areas covered by this Agreement 
between the countries of the former USSR in order to promote the prosperity 
and stability of the region’.13 
Less cryptic were the statements contained in Russia’s ‘Medium-Term 
Strategy’ (2000-2010) for the development of relations with the EU.14 
12 Preamble and Art. 6 of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing 
a Partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one 
Part, and the Russian Federation, of the other Part, Official journal L 327, 28/11/1997 
P. 0003 – 0069 (italics not in the original). Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114138.pdf (accessed on 5.1.2011). As 
mentioned, political, economic and trade issues stood in the foreground of the 
document; cultural affairs were only mentioned en passant.
13 Ibid. (italics not in the original).
14 Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and 
the European Union in Medium-Term Perspective (2000-2010), Diplomaticheskii 
vestnik (Moscow), November 1999. An English version is available at: http://eeas.
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The document, in essence, constituted a response to the EU’s ‘Common 
Strategy’ for relations with Russia, adopted by the Council at its june 
1999 meeting in Cologne.15 It was conveyed to the EU troika by then 
prime minister Putin at the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki in October 
of that year. It explains that Russia’s strategy vis-à-vis the EU was ‘aimed 
at insuring national interests and enhancing the role and image of Russia 
in Europe and in the world’. It demanded that ‘Russia, as a world power 
situated on two continents, should retain its freedom to determine and 
implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of a 
Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS, and its independence 
of its position and activities in international organizations’. The notion of 
integration into a common European space embracing both the EU and 
Russia implicitly is rejected. The term ‘integration’ is mentioned explicitly 
but in a sense entirely different from what the Council had in mind: Russia 
wanted ‘to use the positive experience of integration in the EU with a view 
to consolidating and developing integration processes in the CIS’. 
This position is directly related to the consideration of the area covered 
by the Commonwealth of Independent States as a Russian sphere of 
influence. Russia is referred to as the ‘largest country of the CIS’ with a 
special ‘status and advantages of a Euro-Asian state’. Most importantly, 
the document clarifies that it is not only United States engagement and 
NATO enlargement that the Kremlin considers to be detrimental to 
Russian interests in East Central Europe and the post-Soviet area but also 
the involvement of the EU. This is revealed by statements such as that 
EU enlargement had an ‘ambivalent impact’ on EU-Russia cooperation; 
that Russia ‘reserves the right to refuse agreement to the extension of the 
europa.eu/delegations/russia/index_en.htm (accessed on 27.1.2011). All subsequent 
quotes are from the Russian version; all italics added are not in the original.
15 Common Strategy of the European Union towards Russia. Available at: http://www.
ena.lu/common_strategy_european_ union_1999_414_cfsp_june_1999-020002844.
html (accessed on 10.1.2011).
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PCA’ to EU candidate countries; that it would ‘oppose any attempts to 
hamper economic integration in the CIS’; and, most importantly, that it 
was against the establishment of ‘’special relations’ by the EU with individual 
CIS countries to the detriment of Russian interests’. Since it was obvious that 
Moscow would define what was harmful to its interests, it was probable that 
the eastern dimension of ENP and, even more so, the Eastern Partnership 
would be regarded as attempts to establish ‘special relations’ and as Lavrov 
was to claim, a separate ‘sphere of influence’.
The clarification of Russian perceptions and policies also pertained to 
Kozyrev’s Euroatlantic orientation and the idea and ideal of creating a 
community of values ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Rather than 
endorsing policies directed at the creation of ‘common spaces’ including 
Russia, Europe and the United States, the Strategy stated that the purpose 
and promotion of cooperation in the security area was ‘to counterbalance 
U.S. and NATO dominance’ and ‘NATO-centrism’ in Europe.
Putin, whose ‘socialisation’ had occurred in the Soviet era, in an institution 
entrusted with the maintenance of Soviet power and the Soviet empire, 
has carried Soviet-type stereotypes into current Russian domestic and 
foreign policy. In his perspectives, international politics is still an arena of 
competition and conflict, in which concepts such as the ‘balance of power’ 
and ‘power vacuums’ retain their significance. In international relations, 
as he lectured his diplomats, no ‘power vacuums’ could exist, and that if 
‘Russia were to abstain from an active policy in the CIS or even embark 
on an unwarranted pause, this would inevitably lead to nothing but other, 
more active, states resolutely filling this political space’.16 Furthermore, as 
mentioned, he has called the dissolution of the Soviet Union a ‘national 
tragedy of immense proportions’ and the ‘greatest geopolitical catastrophe 
of the 20th century’.17 Although he hastened to add that this did not mean 
16 Putin’s speech to a conference of Russian ambassadors on 12 july 2004 in Moscow. 
Homepage of the President of the Russian Federation. Available at: http://www.
kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/07/74399.shtml (accessed on 10.1.2011).
17 ‘Putin schitaet raspad SSSR obshchenatsional’noy tragediey’, Nasledie otechestva, 12 
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that Russian policies were directed towards the reconstitution of the USSR, 
he nevertheless proclaimed that the deepening of integration in the CIS, 
in the framework of the Common Economic Space and the Eurasian 
Economic Community, had ‘top priority’ in Russian foreign policy18 and 
that ‘the relations with our closest neighbours were and are the most 
important part of Russia’s foreign policy’.19 
On Putin’s mental map, the EU and NATO’s attempts to extend Western 
influence to the post-Soviet space and thereby reduce Russian influence 
and control are proceeding in tandem with their policies vis-à-vis Russia. 
Such stereotypes, including ‘zero-sum’ perceptions, have surfaced in his 
interpretation of the background to the terrorist act committed in Beslan 
in September 2004. ‘Generally speaking’, Putin stated on Russian television, 
‘one has to admit that we failed to understand the complexities and dangers 
of processes under way in our own country and in the world. At any rate, 
we failed to respond appropriately to them. We showed weakness. And 
the weak get beaten. Some would like to tear off a “juicy piece” from us. 
Others help them. They help, because they believe that Russia as one of 
the major nuclear powers is still a threat to them. A threat that should thus 
be removed. And terrorism is, of course, a mere instrument to achieve 
such aims.’20
February 2004; ‘Khotel uspokoit‘ lyudey’,Gazeta, 13 February 2004; and ‘Poslanie’ 
2005, op. cit. (fn. 6). 
18 Putin in his annual address to the federal assembly in April 2005; see ‘Poslanie’ 2005 
op. cit. (fn. 6).
19 Putin in his annual address to the federal assembly in April 2006. ‘Poslanie 
Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoy Federatsii.’ Homepage of the President of the 
Russian Federation. Available at: www.kremlin.ru/sdocs/appears.shtml (accessed 
on 10.1.2011).
20 Putin in a television address on 4 September 2004. ‘Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossii 
Vladimira Putina.’ Homepage of the President of the Russian Federation. Available 
at: http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/04/1752_type63374type82634 _76320.
shtml (accessed on 15.1.2011).
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The Russian president left unanswered the question as to who those ‘some’ 
(odni) and ‘others’’ (drugie) were who were aiming at Russia’s territorial 
integrity. However, since nuclear weapons are unusable against terrorists 
domestically or internationally and hence not a threat to them, those 
who feel threatened by Russia’s nuclear arsenal must be found elsewhere, 
presumably in the United States and among its European allies. He did 
not, or not directly or explicitly, hold Western governments responsible 
for any attempts to weaken Russia but he was to do so months later in 
response to perceived severe challenges to its influence in Eastern Europe 
and the Caucasus. 
15
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Colour Revolutions and the Community  
of Democratic Choice 
One of the parallels between past Soviet and current Russian attitudes 
towards Western influence in Moscow’s perceived sphere of interest 
concerns ideology and values. Power and the legitimacy of Soviet rule 
in what was then called ‘Eastern Europe’ was based on Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and exercised through the communist parties.21 However, given 
the deficiencies of the communist system in ‘Eastern Europe’ and the 
prosperity of ‘Western Europe’, the Soviet Union was losing the ideological 
and political competition in Europe. The attractiveness of the ‘capitalist’ 
systems and the values of democracy, rule of law, the market economy 
with fair competition and civil society was an objective condition but 
subjectively perceived and portrayed by the Kremlin leaders as ‘inadmissible 
interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries’ and deliberate 
Western government policy at ‘undermining’ their influence and control 
in ‘Eastern Europe’. Such stereotypes returned in full force in the era of the 
so-called ‘colour revolutions’. Their essence, just like in several countries in 
‘Eastern Europe’ in the late 1980s, consisted of broad popular movements 
mostly of young people determined to remove corrupt authoritarian 
regimes from power. In each and every case, the trigger for the large-
scale demonstrations and ultimately the capitulation of the ancien regime 
was blatant fraud in national elections. 
The first such ‘revolution’ that set the pattern occurred in Serbia in October 
2000 with the overthrow of the regime of Slobodan Milošević. Its success 
was largely due to the organisational efforts and skill of the Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia (DOS), a broad reform coalition in which the 
organisation Otpor (Resistance), founded by students in October 1998, 
21 ‘Eastern Europe’ during the Cold War was conceived to cover the countries 
belonging to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. This was notwithstanding the fact that 
East Berlin and Prague are located farther west than Vienna and that Berlin was 
until then considered in Germany to lie in ‘Central’ Germany (Mitteldeutschland), 
not in ‘East’ Germany.
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played a large part in the form of mobilisation of massive civil resistance. 
Moscow considered the turn of events a dual insult as it had supported 
Milošević and Serbia as a Slavic and Orthodox country and long-term 
friend and ally of both Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union during the 
civil war and the NATO bombing campaign. The change of regime from 
authoritarianism to democracy, however, threatened to eradicate the 
remaining degree of Russian influence in the Balkans.
The success of Otpor inspired all subsequent revolutions.22 Thus, in mid-
November 2003, massive anti-governmental demonstrations began in 
the central streets of Tbilisi against the parliamentary elections held 
earlier in the month and considered by the opposition and international 
observers to have been fraudulent, soon involving almost all major cities 
and towns of Georgia. The Kmara!’ (Enough!) youth organization, a 
Georgian counterpart of Otpor, and several NGOs were active in the 
protest activities. Only a few days prior to the mass demonstrations that 
brought down the regime of Eduard Shevardnadze (‘Rose Revolution’), the 
opposition television channel Rustavi-2 twice broadcast a documentary 
on the sequence of events in Serbia that had led to the overthrow of the 
Milošević regime.
In Ukraine, one of the components of a broad coalition taking an active 
role in the ‘Orange Revolution’ was the civic youth organisation Pora! (It 
is time!), founded in 2004 and modelled after its Serbian and Georgian 
counterparts. A series of protests and political actions took place in the 
country in the period from late November 2004 to january 2005 in the 
immediate aftermath of the run-off vote of the presidential elections which, 
as in Serbia and Georgia, were claimed by the supporters of presidential 
contender Viktor Yushchenko to have been marred by massive corruption, 
voter intimidation and outright electoral fraud. The rigging had been in 
22 The interconnections between Serbia’s Otpor (Resistance), Georgia’s Khemri 
(Enough!) and Ukraine’s Pora! (It is time!) have been reconstructed by julie A. 
Corwin, ‘Regime Change on the Cheap’, RFE/RL, 19 April 2005. Available at: http://
www.rferl.org/content/article/1058543.html (accessed on 23.1.2011). 
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favour of presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich who, throughout the 
campaign and even after falsely having declared himself to be the winner 
of the elections, had the unwavering support of Russian authorities and 
Putin personally.23
What is of importance for the present inquiry is that fact that, in Russian 
perspectives, the ouster of three corrupt and authoritarian regimes in 
Europe was primarily not the result of spontaneous and indigenous mass 
demonstrations but the result of careful planning and organisational efforts 
undertaken by external actors. Not only Russian officials in the higher 
echelons of government but also specialists in international relations 
were (and are to this very day) convinced that the ‘colour revolutions’ 
were planned by the governments and executed by the secret services of 
the United States and its European allies, notably Britain, with the active 
participation of ‘so-called’ NGOs. Their arsenals had consisted of campaign 
technologies and techniques, exit and opinion polling, training in ‘strategic 
nonviolent conflict’ and methods of mass mobilisation. Local activists, 
in that view, had received funding and organisational assistance either 
directly from governments through their subordinate agencies such as 
USAID and the British Council but also through government-supported 
foundations such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and 
the International Republican Institute (IRI) in close cooperation with 
allegedly ‘non-partisan’ organisations such as the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) and the network of Hungarian-born billionaire and 
financier George Soros and his Open Society Institute.24 
23 Putin’s personal support for Yankukovich at times had a grotesque quality. For instance, 
on the day after the second electoral round and before any official announcement of 
its results, Putin called his favourite candidate and congratulated him on his election. 
The elections, he ruled, had been ‘transparent and honest’ and Yanukovich’s victory 
‘convincing.’ After the announcement of the (alleged) result, Putin repeated his victory 
gratulations, this time in writing. ‘Putin eshche raz pozdravil Yanukovicha s pobedoy 
na vyborakh.’ Homepage of the President of the Russian Federation. Available at: 
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/news/2004/11/ 80051.shtml (accessed on 10.1.2011).
24 Russian suspicions were seemingly confirmed by the fact that U.S. Ambassador 
Richard Miles had served at critical times in Yugoslavia and Georgia. He was Chief 
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Putin lent presidential authority to such interpretations. In February 
2007, he claimed that ‘the OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus is absolutely 
not connected with the state founders in any way’ and that its ‘decision-
making procedures and the involvement of so-called non-governmental 
organisations are tailored for the task [of promoting] the foreign policy 
interests of one or a group of countries. These organisations are formally 
independent but they are purposefully financed and therefore under 
control. […] We see them as an instrument that foreign states use to carry 
out their Russian policies.’25
The consequence of this, to use political science terminology, ‘narrative’ 
was the consideration of the ‘colour revolutions’ as part of a geostrategic 
competition with the United States and its European allies. Such 
interpretation and corresponding perceptions were, in the Russian 
perspective, seemingly confirmed by the Community of Democratic 
Choice (CDC) founded in December 2005 upon the initiative of the leaders 
of the Rose and the Orange Revolution; the description of its character by 
presidents Yushchenko and Saakashvili as a ‘powerful tool for removing 
the remaining divisions [in the region from the Baltic to the Black Sea], 
human rights violations, and any type of confrontation, or frozen conflict’; 
26 the active role which the new East Central European members of the 
of Mission to Belgrade from 1996 to 23 March 1999, that is, until the very day when 
the U.S. embassy was closed and NATO armed forces began their air attacks against 
targets in Serbia-Montenegro. In Georgia, he served as ambassador from 19 April 
2002 until 15 August 2005.
25 Putin in his speech and subsequent question-and-answer period at the 43rd Munich 
International Security Conference on 10 February 2007. Available at: http://www.
securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu _
konferenzen=&sprache=de&id=179& (accessed on 29.1. 2011).
26 The idea of the creation of the CDC was first mentioned in the common declaration 
of the Georgian and Ukrainian presidents in August 2005 (Borjomi Declaration); see 
‘Borjomi Declaration: Ukraine Victor Yushchenko; Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili’, Forum 
News, 15 August 2005. Available at: http://en.for-ua.com/news/2005/08/15/150055.
html (accessed on 28.1. 2011). The CDC was formally established in Kyiv during a two-
day forum on 1-2 December 2005. Founding member states were Georgia, Ukraine, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Moldova, Slovenia, and the FYR of Macedonia. 
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EU, notably the Baltic States, Poland and the Czech Republic – the ‘New 
Europeans’ in U.S. neo-conservative terminology – were taking in the 
CDC framework;27 and the apparently close coordination of their policies 
with those of the United States. 
The CDC forums held in Kyiv in December 2005 and in Vilnius in May 
2006 were characterized by a spirit of optimism, great expectations and a 
‘common vision’. This consisted of the idea that, in 1989, a first revolution 
had taken place that had successfully transformed the countries of East-
Central Europe into democracies and market economies under the rule of 
law and with an active civil society internally and integrated internationally 
into European and trans-Atlantic institutions such as the EU and NATO 
and that the region, after the dramatic changes in Serbia, Georgia and 
Ukraine, was now engaged in a second democratic revolution. The second 
CDC forum provided the stage not only for the presidents and prime 
ministers of the Central and Eastern European and South Caucasian 
countries to express this common vision but also for U.S. vice president 
Richard Cheney to explain the possible role of the United States in turning 
the vision into reality. 
In mirror images and in conformity with the geopolitical stereotypes of 
the Moscow power elite, Cheney clarified that the export of democracy 
served American strategic interests; that ‘our values and our strategic 
interests are one and the same’.28 Again as if in confirmation of the Russian 
narrative and further challenges ahead for Russia, Cheney outlined future 
27 The categorization of old (America-skeptic) and new (pro-American) Europeans, 
as witnessed by this author, was introduced by the then U.S. Defense Minister 
Donald Rumsfeld in the question-and-answer period (unpublished) at the 41st 
Munich International Security Conference on 12 February 2005, as witnessed by 
this author. 
28 ‘Vice President Richard Cheney. Remarks at the Vilnius Conference of the Community 
for Democratic Choice, May 4, 2006.’ Manuscript distributed at the conference; 
author’s copy. For the full text see ‘Cheney’s Speech in Vilnius.’ Available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/05/04/world/europe/04cnd-cheney-text.html (accessed on 
28.1.2011).
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U.S. policy in the area from the Baltic to the Black Sea: ‘Through direct aid 
and active diplomacy’, he said, ‘the United States will [continue to] give 
our strong support to the development of democratic institutions that are 
transparent, accountable, and decentralized. We’re helping citizen groups to 
promote broad voter participation, and governments to ensure that elections 
conform to international standards of fairness. We have funded programs 
to provide training for journalists, to foster the growth of independent news 
organizations. We’re supporting groups that monitor state action and defend 
human rights. …’29 He further stated that the United States would ‘give strong 
encouragement’ to those countries and political forces in the area that were 
aspiring to EU and NATO membership. 
From the Russian perspective, future risks were thus clearly visible. just 
as the anti-communist revolutions after 1989 had led to the collapse of 
Moscow’s influence and control in East-Central Europe and the Baltic 
States, the ‘colour revolutions’ now threatened the loss of influence in the 
remaining former republics of the USSR. There could be little doubt in 
Moscow as to the danger that Russia would be decoupled from the train of 
European democratisation as defined by the West unless it comprehensively 
– and rapidly – changed both its domestic and foreign policies. The U.S. 
vice president made that abundantly clear. ‘America and all of Europe also 
want to see Russia in the category of healthy, vibrant democracies’, he said. 
‘Yet in Russia today, opponents of reform are seeking to reverse the gains 
of the last decade. In many areas of civil society – from religion and the 
news media, to advocacy groups and political parties – the government has 
unfairly and improperly restricted the rights of her people. Other actions 
by the Russian government have been counterproductive, and could begin 
to affect relations with other countries.’30
That warning about possible negative effects of Russia’s domestic politics 
on its international status and standing was coupled with severe criticism 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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of Russian foreign policy. In obvious reference to the Russian-Ukrainian 
‘gas war’ of 2005/2006 and the (brief) cut-off of natural gas by Gazprom 
in january 2006, the American vice president warned that ‘no legitimate 
interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, 
either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation. 
And no one can justify actions that undermine the territorial integrity of 
a neighbour, or interfere with democratic movements’.31 
The pressures upon Moscow comprehensibly to revise its domestic 
and foreign policy were not only exerted by the United States but also 
by European countries and organisations, including all major EU 
institutions – the Council, the Parliament and the Commission – and 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Even prior to 
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, these institutions charged that the 
system of ‘checks and balances indispensable for the normal functioning 
of democracy’ had been ‘seriously undermined’ in Russia. Changes in 
the procedures for the appointment and dismissal of judges had reduced 
‘prospects for an independent and impartial judiciary’. The circumstances 
of the arrest and prosecution of Khodorkovsky and other leading Yukos 
executives suggested that these charges were politically motivated; that 
the government’s actions in these cases ‘went beyond the mere pursuit of 
criminal justice’; and that they included elements such as the ‘weakening 
of outspoken political opponents, intimidation, and regaining control of 
strategic economic assets’. Parliamentary and presidential elections had 
been marred by the ‘extensive use of administrative resources and control 
of the media to support the president and political parties favoured by 
the government’. Many features of centralisation had been reintroduced, 
including the de facto appointment of the governors by the president. 
There had been ‘harassment and intimidation of members of civil society 
critical of the authorities and in particular of the journalistic, scientific 
and environmentalist communities’. In Chechnya, a ‘climate of impunity 
continues to prevail due to the fact that the Chechen and Federal law 
31 Ibid.
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enforcement authorities are still either unwilling or unable to hold 
accountable for their actions the vast majority of perpetrators of serious 
human rights violations’.32
This (pertinent) diagnosis of developments revealed severe disappointments. 
It reflected the fact that the path Putin’s Russia had embarked upon 
contradicted EU purposes and principles as codified in its Common 
Strategy, namely, that the ‘strategic partnership’ should be based ‘on 
the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of 
European civilisation’. It defied the EU’s ‘clear strategic goals’ of helping to 
achieve ‘a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the 
rule of law, […] a prosperous market economy, […] civil society, [… and] 
the integration of Russia into a common European economic and social 
space’.33 Furthermore, it ran counter to the very theoretical foundation 
Western policies: Based on the experience of the East-Central European 
countries, Western scholars had constructed theories of ‘transition’ which 
posited that post-Soviet countries, after a certain time period, would 
transform themselves into Western-style democracies with a free market, 
the rule of law and civil society.34 Russia, however, got ‘lost in transition’;35 
32 The documents containing these elements of comprehensive criticism are as follows: 
European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common 
Security and Defence Policy, Report With a Proposal for a European Parliament 
Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations, Rapporteur: Bastiaan 
Belder, Final A-5-0053/2004; Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on Relations With Russia, COM (2004) 106 09/02/04; 
Assessment Report by the European Council, 23 February 2004 (confidential 
document); and Resolution 1455 by the Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Respect of the Obligations and Commitments 
Undertaken by the Russian Federation, 22 june 2005.
33 All of these objectives can be found in the part dealing with Principal Objectives; see 
Common Strategy of the European Union towards Russia, op. cit. (fn. 15).
34 The learned treatises are too numerous to be cited. A summary can be found in 
jordan Gans-Morse, ‘Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-
Communist Transitions’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October-November 
2004), pp. 320-49.
35 This is the apt title of the book by Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition: The 
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under Putin, it developed a political system sui generis, labelled the ‘Putin 
system’ by Western analysts, a ‘managed democracy’ at first that turned 
into ‘management’ of politics, the economy and society by the Kremlin. 
‘Democracy’ in Russia, as Putin clarified, required ‘manual control’.36
The domestic developments are of considerable importance for the present 
inquiry. In any political system, there is a close interrelationship between 
domestic politics and foreign policy. Perceptions of the leadership about 
politics and society as well as ordering principles of the system tend to be 
projected to the foreign policy realm. In the Russian case, such projection 
is even more likely in relation to the post-Soviet space because that space 
is not regarded as an autonomous or independent part of the international 
system but, as described above, a ‘sphere of influence’ in which Russia 
has ‘special’, ‘vital’ or ‘privileged’ interests. To that extent, the Kremlin’s 
policies towards the post-Soviet space are ranged somewhere between 
domestic and foreign policy; they can be regarded as an extension of 
domestic politics;37 vice versa, developments in the CIS area significantly 
affect Russian domestic politics. In the perceptions of the Russian power 
elite, therefore, the possible realisation of a second wave of democratic 
and liberal revolutions in the western CIS area and the Caucasus could 
have dire consequences not just for Russian influence in the region but 
Yeltsin and Putin Legacies (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2007).
36 Putin in October 2007, speaking to journalists. For the quote and the subsequent 
observation that the political system developed under Putin had progressed from 
‘managed democracy’ to ‘manual control’ see Robert Coalson, ‘Russia: Moscow 
Shifts From “Managed Democracy” to “Manual Control”’, RFE/RL Research, 
3 December 2007. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1079227.html 
(accessed on 29.01.2011).
37 Institutionally, this was reflected in the creation of a special Ministry for Cooperation 
with CIS Countries in 1994 but it was given few resources and little policy-making 
authority and was finally disbanded in May 2000. Thereafter, it appears that, during 
Putin’s two terms in office, he and the presidential administration were taking charge 
of relations with the CIS countries and that he still taking an active role in policy 
towards these countries as head of government.
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also – as unlikely that may have seemed from Western perspectives – for 
Russia itself. 
In fact, reactions of the Kremlin almost verged on panic. Based on the 
assumption of coup d’états having been manufactured by of Western 
governments, special services and government-supported NGOs in 
cooperation with indigenous organisations, the Kremlin sharply tightened 
the rules on the activities of both foreign and local NGOs in Russia; it 
created and lavishly funded the youth organisation Nashi (Ours) in support 
of government policy; and, in part with that organisation’s help, suppressed 
and harassed any, even the smallest anti-government demonstration; and 
it went on a counter-offensive internationally to neutralise the threat of 
further infection of its neighbourhood with the ‘colour revolution’ and 
CDC viruses. 
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Collapse of the Challenge to Russian Influence  
and Control in the CIS Area
The threat was neutralised as a result of both Russian counteraction and 
indigenous developments in the region. Counteraction took many forms, the 
first being conveyance of the message that Russia was steadfastly developing 
democratic institutions and in EU-Russian relations, on the basis of common 
values, actively striving for the realisation of the four ‘common spaces’ and 
their associated ‘road maps’ as well as negotiation of a replacement of the 
PCA.38 Theorists under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
attempted to show that, in the history of western civilization, many variants 
of non-liberal democracy – aristocratic, oligarchic, egalitarian and national 
– had existed and could continue to be created.39 Vladimir Surkov, one of 
Putin’s deputy chiefs of the presidential administration, added his own 
(nonsensical) classification, declaring the political system as it had developed 
under Putin as being that of a ‘sovereign democracy’, the significance of 
the ‘sovereign’ apparently being that it should ‘not be managed from the 
outside’.40 Nevertheless, in the competition with the EU, the theorists backed 
38 In May 2003, at the St. Petersburg summit, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce 
their co-operation by creating, in the long term, four common spaces in the 
framework of the PCA, and, at the May 2005 Moscow summit, they adopted a single 
package of Road Maps for the realization of the Common Spaces. – – Negotiations 
on a replacement of the PCA started at the EU-Russia summit in Khanty-Mansiisk 
in june 2008. They were stopped because of the August war in the Caucasus and 
resumed after the EU summit in Nice in November 2008. As of this writing, they are 
still on-going.
39 See the anthology published under the auspices of the Institute of International 
Welfare of the Russian Academy of Sciences, A.V. Fenenko (ed.), Kontseptsii i 
opredeleniya demokratii, Moscow 2006. A table and contents and summary are 
Available at: http://urss.ru/cgi-bin/db.pl?cp=&page=Book&id=48931&lang=en&b
lang=ru&list=14 (accessed on 28.1.2011).
40 The creator of this nonsense is Vladimir Surkov. In November 2006, then first 
deputy prime minister and future president Dmitry Medvedev, in an interview 
with the journal ‘Ekspert’ felt obliged to criticize the term, correctly pointing out 
that ‘sovereignty’ and ‘democracy’ were two entirely different conceptual categories 
that could not be mixed. Mededev interview. Available at: http://www.expert.ru/
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and inspired by the Kremlin had a problem: In contrast to the EU and its 
confident claim that the domestic systems and the integration processes for 
the construction of a common European space were valid for all of Europe, 
including Russia, the Russian variant of ‘democratic’ authoritarianism, 
centralisation (emphasis on the ‘vertical axis of power’, the vertikal’ vlast’) and 
even officially admitted enormous corruption and pervasive ‘legal nihilism’ 
could not and was not proclaimed to be a model for all of Europe.41
Being relatively weak on ‘soft power’ and specifically not being able to 
portray Russia as a model for political, economic and social development, 
the countermeasures against the spread of ‘colour revolutions’ and Western 
orientation of neighbouring countries were assembled from the tool box of 
‘hard power’. Since no plausible case could be made that the EU was engaged 
in geostrategic games against Moscow, engagement by the United States in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and NATO ‘expansion’ were 
selected as the primary targets in a comprehensive campaign of threat and 
pressure. This had both political and military dimensions, and it included 
the instrumentalisation of ‘frozen conflicts’. 
The campaign was launched by Putin in February 2007 at the 43rd Munich 
International Security Conference.42 The accession of the Baltic States to the 
Western alliance in March 2004 had been tantamount to the transgression 
of the ‘red line’ that Yeltsin had attempted to draw along the former borders 
of the Soviet Union. At the time of Putin’s speech in Munich, Russian-
NATO controversies concerned the possible offer of a Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia at the forthcoming NATO 
summit in Bucharest in April 2008.43 It was evident that Russia wanted to 
expert/2006/28/interview_medvedev/ (accessed on 17.1.2007).
41 That characterisation is Medvedev’s, see his ‘Speech at the All-Russia Civic Forum’, 
22 january 2008. Available at: http://www.medvedev2008.ru/english_2008_01_22.
htm (accessed on 11.2.2011).
42 Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich International Security Conference, op. cit. (fn. 
25).
43 Yeltsin hat used that term explicitly at the G7/G8 summit conference in Birmingham 
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prevent such a step almost at all cost. He cast the enlargement of NATO 
eastwards in moral terms as a breach of allegedly firm ‘assurances’ not to 
expand eastwards after German unification and a ‘severe provocation’.44 
There was consistency in his portrayal of NATO as an alliance ill-disposed 
towards Russia: Almost a decade earlier, he had called NATO ‘a military 
and political bloc with all the set of threats that any formation of this type 
involves [whose] ‘movement closer to the borders of Russia forces us to 
take adequate measures to raise the level of the country’s security’.45 Only 
four weeks prior to the Bucharest summit, Putin warned that in response 
to Ukrainian membership Russia would have to take ‘countermeasures’ 
and would be ‘forced to target its nuclear offensive systems at Ukraine’.46
The opposition to NATO enlargement in its 2007-2008 variant was 
put into the context of the foreign policy of the United States with its 
‘disdain’, as Putin put it, ‘for the basic principles of international law 
[and overstepping] its national borders in every way […] visible in the 
economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on 
other nations’ and alleged U.S. attempts to build up combat forces and 
establish a military-political infrastructure close to Russian borders. 
The elements he mentioned that fit into such a strategy included (1) 
Washington’s plans to station components of the U.S. national anti-
ballistic missile system in East-Central Europe – a phased-array radar 
system in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland; (2) 
non-ratification by the NATO member countries of the Adapted Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) apparently with a view towards 
in May 1998. – In previous cases of countries joining NATO, the Membership Action 
Plan preceded full membership.
44 Ibid.
45 Putin as early as December 1999 in his then position as prime minister; interview 
with the Financial Times, 11.12.1999.
46 Putin on the occasion of the visit by Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko to Moscow 
at the joint press conference on 12 February 2008. Homepage of the President of the 
Russian Federation. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/02/12/2027_
type63377type63380_160013.shtml (accessed on 25.2.2008).
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deploying substantial forces and building up military infrastructure in 
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus; and (3) the deployment of ‘flexible 
frontline American bases [in Romania and Bulgaria] with up to five 
thousand men in each’ and ‘NATO frontline forces on our borders’.47
To counter such alleged possible challenges to Russian security, the 
Kremlin and its generals built up an edifice of threat, pressure and 
countermeasures. Its building blocks consisted of (1) withdrawal from the 
CFE treaty (‘moratorium’), providing Russia with the option to increase 
its forces facing NATO, including at the ‘flanks’, that is, the Baltic region 
and the Caucasus; (2) threats of withdrawal from the 1987 treaty on 
the abolition of intermediate-range ballistic missiles; (3) the stationing 
of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad and Belarus as a 
possible consequence; (4) the resumption of long-range patrol flights of 
Russian strategic aircraft over North Atlantic and Pacific areas; (5) test 
series of the most modern of the land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missile, the RS-24 (‘Topol-M’), and its sea-based variant (‘Bulava’); (6) 
announcement by the Navy of plans to equip its forces with six new aircraft 
carriers, as in Soviet times, to station a flotilla (eskadra) in the eastern 
Mediterranean, and to construct a naval base in Latakia in Syria; (7) large-
scale manoeuvres of the Shanghai Organisation for Security (SOC) on 
Russian territory, near Chelyabinsk, in the presence of Putin and Chinese 
president Hu jintao; and (8) announcement of the defence ministry’s 
programme to spend 5.000 billion roubles (US$ 197 billion) in the period 
2007-2015 for the modernisation of the Russian armed forces.48
47 Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich International Security Conference, op. cit. (fn. 
25). For documentation and analysis of the Russian policies towards NATO see 
Hannes Adomeit and Frank Kupferschmidt, Russia-NATO Relations: Stagnation or 
Revitalization? SWP-Research Report RP-02 (2008). Available at: http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/produkte/swp_studie.php?id=9048&PHPSESSID=890bf7634126ff99
41d20d214fdd29e2 (accessed on 28.1.2011.)
48 For documentation and analysis of these military moves and maneuvers see Hannes 
Adomeit, ‘Russlands Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Putin und Medwedjew’, 
Österreichische Militärzeitschrift, Vienna, No. 3 (2009), pp. 283-92
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The intent behind the elaborate threat posture was obvious, that is, to drive 
a wedge between the U.S. and the ‘new European’ governments, on the 
one hand, and the population of these European countries plus the ‘old’ 
European governments, such as the German, French, Italian governments, 
on the other. The wedge, directed primarily at Europeans, consisted of the 
threat of a return to the military-political confrontation of the Cold War: 
‘Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable 
arms race?’, Putin asked. ‘I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.’49 
By the time of the Bucharest NATO summit in April 2008, it was evident 
that the majority of the European members of NATO were not prepared 
to follow the American lead and offer MAP to Ukraine and Georgia. The 
Russian campaign of pressure and threat in all likelihood had contributed 
to that outcome.
Nevertheless, Putin apparently wanted to make sure that such an option, 
still held out by NATO in principle, would in practice be closed forever. 
Thus, at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Bucharest on 4 April 
2008, Putin stated publicly and unequivocally (having in mind both Ukraine 
and Georgia): ‘The presence of a powerful military bloc on our borders, 
whose members are guided, in particular, by Article 5 of the Washington 
treaty, will be seen by Russia as a direct threat to our country’s security’.50 
Privately, in Bucharest on the same day and two days later in Sochi, he 
told president Bush that he apparently did not understand that ‘Ukraine is 
not a real state;’ that much of its territory had been ‘given away’ by Russia; 
that while western Ukraine belonged to Eastern Europe, eastern Ukraine 
is ‘ours’; and that, if Ukraine entered NATO, Russia would detach eastern 
49 Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich International Security Conference, op. cit. (fn. 
25). ‘In this case’ referred to the stationing of U.S. radar and missile interceptors in 
the Czech Republic and Poland. 
50 At the press conference in Bucharest on April 4, 2008, after the meeting of the NATO-
Russia Council. Homepage of the President of the Russian Federation. Available at: 
http://www.kremlin.ru/sdocs/appears.shtml?day=4&month=04&year= 2008&value_
from=&value_to=&date=&stype=&dayRequired=no&day_enable=true&Submit.
x=11&Submit.y=10.
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Ukraine (and presumably the Crimean Peninsula) and graft them onto 
Russia and, thus, Ukraine would ‘cease to exist as a state’.51 The territorial 
integrity of Georgia was similarly put in question. Putin warned Bush 
that if Georgia moved toward NATO membership, Russia might respond 
by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s secession from Georgia. 
Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, chief of general staff Yury Baluyevsky 
and ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin followed the president’s lead, 
Rogozin warning that attempting ‘to push Georgia into the Western alliance 
is a provocation that could lead to bloodshed’; membership of the country 
in NATO would be ‘the end of Georgia as a sovereign state’.52 The August 
2008 Russian military intervention and Moscow’s subsequent recognition 
of the independence of the two separatist republics may not mean the end 
of a sovereign Georgia and an EaP partner but in all likelihood the end of 
the country’s territorial integrity and the dream of NATO membership. 
The Russo-Georgian war, however, also marks a watershed in Russian 
foreign policy. 
51 Documentation by Stephen Blank, ‘Russia versus NATO in the CIS’, RFE/RL 
Research, 14 May 2008. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1117479.
html (accessed on 2.2.2011) and Vladimir Socor, ‘Moscow Makes Furious but 
Empty Threats to Georgia and Ukraine’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 70, 
14 April 2008. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33544 (accessed on 2.2.2011).
52 ‘Moskau warnt vor NATO-Aufnahme Georgiens und der Ukraine’, Spiegel online, 8 
March 2008. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,540286,00.
html (accessed on 2.2.2011).
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The Effects of the Global Financial  
and Economic Crisis on Russia
The policy change was due to the confluence of the following factors 
that still apply today: (1) Containment of the negative repercussions of 
the Russian military intervention on the relations with the U.S., NATO 
and the EU; (2) the collapse of confident assumptions of the Kremlin 
that Russia was an ‘island of stability’ immune to the effects of the global 
financial and economic crisis; (3) the replacement of the neoconservative 
government in Washington by a new administration under Barack Obama 
ready to embark on a ‘reset’ in U.S-Russian relations; (4) the election of 
the personified target of the Orange Revolution as president of Ukraine 
and, for all practical purposes, the mitigation of the challenge of a spread 
of ‘colour revolutions’ to other parts of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. 
However, whereas Russian foreign policy changed in relation to the United 
States, NATO and some of the ‘new’ Europeans, notably Poland, Russia’s 
domestic politics and – not least as a as a result – Moscow’s policies in the 
near neighbourhood remained essentially unchanged. 
In detail, Putin’s policies of pressure had to a large extent been due to 
perceptions of the power elite that authoritarianism and recentralisation 
had worked; that it had led to political stability and economic growth 
domestically; and that it had brought about higher status, prestige and 
influence internationally. The new government in Washington had 
essentially capitulated and embarked on a ‘reset’ of relations with Russia, 
the first major indication of this being the abandonment of plans for 
the stationing of components of the U.S. strategic anti-ballistic missile 
system in Poland and the Czech Republic. After some, from Moscow’s 
perspectives, pointless pouting about the military intervention in Georgia 
and the unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by the 
end of the year both NATO and the EU had returned to ‘business as 
usual’ in their relations with Russia. Significant gains were apparently 
being made in the competition for influence in Eastern Europe and the 
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Caucasus: The U.S. government seemed to adjust to new realities in the 
region by promising nothing more that ‘tough love’ to the (also in its eyes) 
controversial leaderships of Yushchenko and Saakashvili. The perceived 
threat of NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia was averted and 
a MAP for Moldova not even on NATO’s agenda. The challenges of the 
Orange and other possible ‘colour revolutions’ in the area had for all 
practical purposes dissipated. The fact that a major policy change – at 
least in the eyes of president Medvedev – nevertheless seemed required 
can be explained by the significant negative repercussions of the global 
financial and economic crisis on Russia.
The high economic growth rates and the arrogance of power in its wake had 
to a large extent been based on a rise in the price of oil from lows of less 
than US$ 20 per barrel in 1998 about US$ 150 the summer of 2008. Since 
the price for natural gas is, after some time lag, tied to the gas price, Russian 
hard currency incomes from the export of energy resources had increased 
substantially. One of its consequences was, in comparison with the Yeltsin 
era, significantly improved financial condition of the country with currency 
reserves amounting to US$ 597 billion at the onset of the global financial 
and economic crisis in 2008. The Russian economy, too, benefited from the 
windfall profits; in the year preceding the global crisis, its growth rate had 
amounted to an impressive 8.1%. The Russian leadership confidently talked 
about creating a ‘Gas OPEC’ and it presented itself as an up-and-coming 
global economic power at the first (and so far last) meeting of the BRIC 
group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in Moscow in May 
2008. Even as the global crisis deepened with the bankruptcy of the financial 
services firm Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Russian politicians and 
economists continued to celebrate Russia as an ‘island of stability’.53 
53 The characterisation originated with finance minister Aleksey Kudrin who 
proclaimed at the World Economic Forum in Davos in january 2008 Russia to be an 
‘island of stability in the sea of the world crisis’. ‘Russia, Island of Stability, May Save 
the World from Global Crisis’, internet website pravda.ru, 24 january 2008. Available 
at: http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/24-01-2008/103625-russia_crisis-0/# 
(accessed on 7.2. 2011).
34
Russia and Its Near Neighbourhood: Competition and Conflict with the EU
Such notions were disappointed by actual developments. As in the Western 
industrialized countries, the Russian financial system went into crisis 
first and then the economy. In the period from May to October 2008, 
the Russian stock market index RTS fell by 75%, a catastrophic shrinkage 
that exceeded that of the OECD countries and for some time required a 
moratorium on the trade with securities. Currency reserves fell by more 
than a third in the period from August 2008 to March 2009, from US$ 
597 billion to US$ 376 billion. GDP in the first half of 2009 decreased 
by 10.4% and in the whole year compared to 2008 by 8.7%. The most 
disastrous figures obtained in manufacturing industry with output falling 
by 20.8% in the first quarter of 2009 and in the car industry by 55.9%.54 
These data contrasted sharply with those of the other BRIC countries: The 
Chinese and Indian economy continued to grow in 2009, and the Brazilian 
economy stayed on an even keel.
One of the major reasons for the disproportionately greater impact of the 
crisis on Russia can be found in the structural deficiencies of its finances 
and the economy. These continue to be crucially dependent on hard 
currency earnings from the export of raw materials, above all, oil and 
gas. Prior to the crisis, the oil and gas sector of the Russian economy 
accounted for about one third of GDP; the share of fuel exports amounted 
to almost two thirds of all exports; and the receipts from these exports 
covered approximately half of the state budget. It was, therefore, inevitable 
that the drastic fall of the oil price as a result of a contraction of demand on 
the world market would produce major shocks. These were compounded 
by foreign investors massively withdrawing funds in order to improve 
liquidity and Russian firms transferring financial assets abroad. The 
significant flow of credit that had driven the wheels of the Russian financial 
54 All statistical data according to the Russian state statistical service, Goskomstat 
Rossii. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/
account/ (accessed on 10.2. 2011). For analysis of the data see Hannes Adomeit, 
‘Was will Russland? Interessenssphären oder Modernisierungspartnerschaft(en)?’, 
in: johann Pucher and johann Frank (eds.), Strategie und Sicherheit 2011, Böhlau, 
Vienna, Cologne and Weimar, 2011, pp. 67–76.
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and economic system stopped and so did, for all practical purposes, the 
system itself.
It is the recognition of the structural deficiencies that, in conjunction 
with the other above-mentioned factors, contributed to the change in 
Russian foreign policy. The arrogance of power and campaigns of pressure 
that had characterised the last two years of Putin’s second term and the 
period up to and including the military intervention in Georgia gave 
way to more sober assessments and approaches. In September 2009, 
the new president, who had earlier decried Russia’s ‘legal nihilism’,55 
published a manifesto entitled ‘Forward, Russia!’ in which he called for 
the comprehensive ‘modernisation’ of the country.56 Radical change was 
required. He held it to be vitally necessary to overcome the centuries-
long ‘backwardness of Russia’, its ‘primitive raw materials economy’ and 
the ‘degrading dependency on raw materials’. In addition to an ‘ineffective 
economy’, he decried the country’s ‘chronic corruption’, ‘quasi-Soviet social 
system’ and ‘demographic decline’.57 Two months later he demanded that 
‘lessons be drawn from the past time period when the oil price increased’. 
Lots of people had clung to the ‘illusion that structural reforms could 
be postponed’ and that one could just go on forever with the priority 
development of the raw materials economy. However, the time had come 
‘to begin without further delay with the modernisation and technological 
renewal of the whole sphere of production. … The future of the country 
depends on this.’58 
55 Medvedev, ‘Speech at the All-Russia Civic Forum’, op. cit. (fn. 41). 
56 ‘Rossiya, vpered!’ on the internet website of gazeta.ru, 11 September 2009. Available 
at: http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/09/10_a_3258568.shtml (accessed on 
11.2. 2011).
57 Ibid.
58 Dmitry Medvedev on 12 November 2009 in his state-of-the-nation address. ‘Poslanie 
Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii’. Homepage of the President of the 
Russian Federation. Homepage of the President of the Russian Federation. Available 
at: http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979 (accessed on 1.2. 2011). 
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Medvedev also drew consequences for Russia’s external relations. Foreign 
policy had to be put to work for modernisation. This was not just a 
matter of providing ‘tangible assistance to Russian enterprises abroad 
and efforts for the introduction of quality brands of [Russian] for goods 
and services [abroad] but also attracting foreign investments and modern 
technologies in Russia.’59 The foreign ministry, Putin demanded, should 
design a ‘programme for the effective utilisation of foreign policy factors’ 
for the modernisation of the country. The ministry duly obliged. Following 
verbatim the president’s demand, it compiled a Programme for the Effective 
Utilisation of Foreign Policy Factors for the Long-Term Development of 
Russia – a classified document dated February 2010, signed and prefaced 
by foreign minister Lavrov and addressed to president Medvedev.60 The 
thread that runs through the document is the perceived necessity of 
creating ‘modernisation alliances’ with EU member states, with France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain singled out for ‘priority co-operation’ and the 
Franco-German ‘tandem’ to help gain approval for new policies at EU 
level. It also speaks of developing a Russia-EU-US ‘triangle’ to further the 
Russian modernisation agenda.
59 Ibid.
60 ‘Programma effektivnogo ispol’zovaniya na sistemnoy osnove vneshnepoliticheskikh 
faktorov v tselyakh dolgosrochnogo razvitiya Rossiyskogo Federatsii’, Homepage 
of Russkiy Newsweek, 11 May 2010. Available at: http://www.runewsweek.ru/
country/34184/ (accessed on 7.10.2010).
37
The Effects of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on Russia 
‘Modernization Partnerships’  
versus Spheres of Influence
In some respects, Russian foreign policy practice has followed, in part even 
anticipated, the Programme. 
Concerning •	 EU-Russia relations, the summits in Stockholm in November 
2009 and Rostov-on-Don in May 2010 as well as negotiations in Brussels 
on a new agreement to replace the PCA proceeded in a constructive 
spirit. President of the EU Commission josé Manuel Barroso described 
the Stockholm summit as ‘one of the best meetings we ever had’.61 The 
EU-Russia ‘modernisation partnership’ was officially launched at the 
Rostov summit. 
President Medvedev attended the •	 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting 
in Lisbon in November 2010. The meeting not only marked the official 
restoration of relations after the historical low following the Russia-
Georgia war but it was also heralded by summit participants as a ‘historic 
breakthrough’. Both sides approved a document spelling out a common 
understanding of national security threats. NATO invited Russia to 
participate in a European ballistic missile defence system; Medvedev 
accepted the invitation and spelled out his vision of the system. Furthermore, 
Moscow agreed to allow armoured vehicles for mine clearance to cross 
Russian territory to Afghanistan. 
Concerning •	 Russia’s relationship with the United States, in january 2011, 
both houses of parliament approved the new Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START), signalling the end of a series of legislative procedures in 
both countries required for the Treaty to come into effect.62 On another 
61 As quoted by Katinka Barysch, ‘Can and Should the EU and Russia Reset Their 
Relationship?’. Homepage of the Center for European Reform, 22 February 2010. 
Available at: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_eu_russia_22feb10.pdf (accessed on 
10.2. 2011).
62 The treaty provides for the limitation of nuclear warheads held by each country to 
1,550 and delivery vehicles – ballistic missiles and heavy bombers – to 700 by the 
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sensitive issue, Moscow agreed in june 2010 to impose new sanctions on 
Iran in an attempt, jointly with the U.S. and the EU, to put pressure on the 
Islamic republic to discontinue its Uranium enrichment programme.
Moscow made efforts to improve •	 Russian-Polish relations. The primary 
means in this endeavour was the reconsideration of Stalin’s policies 
towards Poland. In September 2009, Putin had begun that process by 
attending the ceremonies in Gdansk to mark the 70th anniversary of the 
outbreak of World War II. In April 2010, he became the first Russian or 
Soviet leader to join Polish officials in commemorating the anniversary 
of the murder of thousands of Polish officers by the Soviet Union at the 
beginning of World War II (Katyn massacre); in moving embraces of 
Polish prime minister Tusk, he expressed his grief over the crash of the 
high-ranking Polish participants for the commemoration in Smolensk.
After four decades of negotiation, in September 2010, •	 Russia and Norway 
concluded an agreement delineating their maritime arctic borders and 
defining exclusive economic zones and rights to their assigned portions 
of the continental shelf, thereby opening the possibility for both countries 
to develop the vast oil and natural gas reserves in the Barents Sea. 
In january 2010, the Duma and the upper chamber of the Russian •	
Parliament, the Federation Council, voted in favour of a significant 
reform of the procedures of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), ratifying Protocol 14 to the Convention, thereby clearing the 
way for the Protocol, already ratified by the other 46 States Parties, to 
enter into force.
Finally, •	 Russian policies on post-Soviet space appeared to have changed. 
It seemed no longer interested in cooperation and integration within the 
CIS framework. In October 2009, only seven of the nominally eleven 
CIS member states took part in the summit meeting of the organisation 
end of 2017. At the 43rd Munich International Security Conference in early February 
2011, foreign ministers Clinton and Lavrov exchanged intruments of ratification.
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in Chisinau; the meeting was adjourned after only 30 minutes and the 
gala dinner cancelled.63
 The Kremlin did not interfere in the popular revolution in Kyrgyzstan •	
against president Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April 2010; it quickly recognised 
the government of Rosa Otunbaeya that was created in its wake; and it 
rejected an appeal by the new Kyrgyz government to send peacekeeping 
troops to help in the restoration of order after the outbreak of ethnic 
violence in the south of the country. 
 On a more general level, foreign minister Lavrov had explained that •	
Russia’ ‘modernization strategy’ was, among others things, designed 
to alter perceptions in the neighbouring countries and to make Russia 
appear more attractive to them – in Western terminology, to enhance 
Russia’s ‘soft power’. He reiterated the Kremlin’s standard position 
that ‘the former Soviet Union countries are our priority partners. 
Likewise, Russia is the country where their privileged interests are 
concentrated.’ However, he also acknowledged that the ‘interest of the 
United States and Europe in these areas is absolutely objective. The 
only thing we want is that these legitimate interests should be realized 
not to the detriment of Russia’s equally legitimate interests, and that 
these interests are realized through legitimate, understandable and 
transparent methods. […] Most of the problems in this space arise 
because of attempts to intervene from outside in determining the paths 
along which these countries are developing.’ Mirror imaging Western 
perceptions of Russian policies in neighbouring countries, Lavrov 
concluded that ‘We have been urging everyone, for quite a long time, 
to act openly and honestly in this sphere, not to play some geopolitical 
games, not to carry out virtual projects and not to hide intentions but 
63 The seven participant countries were Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. For details see Anders Aslund, ‘The Kremlin’s New 
Policy in Its Near Abroad’, Moscow Times, 28 july 2010. Available at: http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-kremlins-new-policy-in-its-near-
abroad/411170.html.
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to state interests honestly and straightforwardly. […] There should be 
no zero-sum games.’64 
On the basis of such Russian assurances and policies in their wake, Western 
analysts have confidently asserted that, in 2009-2010, ‘Russian policies in the 
neighbourhood changed radically’; they ‘genuinely changed for the simple 
reason that the Kremlin realizes the old aggressive policy has completely 
failed. […] Russia’s new policy is essentially pragmatic and focusing on its 
national interests, grounded in the need to modernize and attract foreign 
investment.’65 However, closer scrutiny of Russia’s conduct abroad (and at 
home) confirm that Lavrov’s criticism of U.S. and European policies in ‘its’ 
neighbourhood are a classic case of the pot calling the kettle black. 
The fact that Russia’s policies on post-Soviet space have a strong bilateral 
dimension and that the Chisinau summit was a failure neither means that 
multilateral and integrative approaches have been abandoned nor that 
they have failed across the board. Such interpretations can be confirmed 
by a review of the proceedings and the results of two high-level gatherings 
held on 10 December 2010 in Moscow – the summits of the CIS and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – at which the participating 
heads of state discussed the current state of economic integration and the 
future of their military cooperation. ‘One of the major outcomes of the CIS 
summit was the signing of a number of important documents, such as the 
Concept of a Youth Policy Development Strategy up to 2020, the Schedule 
of Events for Implementation of the Concerted Border Policies, and the 
joint Program of Action against Terrorism, Extremism, Organized Crime 
and Drug Trafficking. […] Moreover, the CIS gathering yielded a long-
awaited breakthrough in the economic chapter of the Commonwealth, 
which was indicated by the announcement by the Russian leader of the 
forthcoming creation of a free trade area. […] This multilateral treaty is 
64 ‘Russia Does not Want “Zero-Sum” Geopolitical Games in CIS – Lavrov’, Vesti TV, 
10 December 2008, as recorded by BBC Monitoring (italics not in the original).
65 Aslund, ‘The Kremlin’s New Policy in Its Near Abroad’, op. cit. (fn. 63).
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expected to replace a hundred existing arrangements concerning mutual 
trade among CIS Member States. The draft version of the free trade area 
agreement encompasses a string of WTO norms governing issues relating 
to the abolition of customs duties and quantitative trade restrictions, and 
also stipulates the freedom of transit, special safeguard measures, anti-
dumping and compensatory mechanisms, subsidizing rules as well as 
sanitary provisions and arbitration procedures. 
Medvedev positively commented on the contribution of the CIS to the 
restoration of economic relations severed by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and its beneficial impact on the consolidation of inter-state 
trust and collaborative practices. He also deplored the withdrawal of 
Georgia from the CIS provisions, saying that “the Georgians cannot 
communicate with all countries at a time and some agreements are no 
longer valid for them”. […] 
The heads of CSTO member states signed a few agreements governing the 
status of CSTO rapid response forces which were created in February 2009 
to jointly counter any external threats capable of disrupting national or 
regional stability and peace. Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko proposed, on 
behalf of his country which will be chairing the CSTO [in 2011], to equip 
nascent CSTO forces with modern military capabilities and to organize 
regular military exercises to boost their field experience. The next round 
of joint exercises between Russia and Belarus will take place in 2011 on 
Russian territory. Lukashenko also suggested the creation of the CSTO 
Institute for Partnership intended to spread the Organization’s influence 
beyond its territorial borders. […]
One day earlier, on 9 December 2010, the Kremlin [had] opened its doors 
for another meeting, [that of] of the heads of state of the Customs Union 
comprised of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The three presidents signed 
another 17 legally binding instruments which are expected to finalize the 
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creation of the Single Economic Space from 1 january 2012.’66 
Whatever the degree or speed of implementation of the agreements, it is 
evident that the aim of CIS economic and CSTO military cooperation and 
integration in Russia’s neighbourhood policy remains unchanged  – and 
so does its opposition to EU attempts at drawing its eastern neighbours 
closer to the acquis communautaire. The Kremlin, it appears, continues 
to believe that the EU’s Eastern Partnership is one of those inadmissible 
‘geopolitical games’ Lavrov was speaking of, considering it, as quoted, 
as ‘an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence’.67 It is undeniable 
that the project was supported mainly by foreign ministries (Poland and 
Sweden) concerned about Russian policies and intentions in Europe; that 
it gained momentum after the Russian military intervention in Georgia; 
and that it included Belarus not least because of rifts between Russia and 
Belarus and (apparent) new options opening up for the EU. At the EU-
Russia summit in Khabarovsk, held shortly after the official launching 
of the EaP, Medvedev could therefore say (with some exaggeration) that 
he was ‘embarrassed by the fact that some states view this partnership 
as a partnership against Russia’.68 Embarrassed did not necessarily mean 
worried. Indeed, it did not take long for the Russian leadership to regard 
the EaP as harmless. ‘Frankly speaking’, Medvedev stated six months after 
the EaP was officially launched, ‘I don’t see anything extraordinary in the 
Eastern Partnership [but] I don’t see any special use in it either; all the 
participants of this partnership are confirming this to me.’69
66 Summary of the proceedings of the meetings and their results by Georgiy Voloshin, 
‘End of 2010 Sees Increased Integration in CIS and CSTO’. Homepage of Central 
Asia-Caucasus Analyst (CACI), 22 December 2010. Available at: http://cacianalyst.
org/?q=node/5472 (accessed on 12.2.2010).
67 ‘EU Expanding its “Sphere of Influence”’, Russia Says’, op. cit. (fn. 8). 
68 Medvedev on 22 May 2009 in Khabarovsk at the press conference after the EU-
Russia summit. Homepage of the Russian President. Available at: http://archive.
kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/05/22/1419_type82915_216713.shtml (accessed on 
11.2.2011) (italics not in the original).
69 President Medvedev on November 2009, talking to journalists from Belarus at 
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The expression of a casual attitude, however, does not mean that the 
Kremlin is unconcerned about Western influence and presence in its near 
neighbourhood. It considers itself actively engaged in a competitive game 
in which it has good cards – if not to say trump cards in the form of the 
two ‘hard power’ attributes: regional military preponderance, and oil and 
gas resources. The latter is being used in what Anatoly Chubais called 
‘liberal imperialism’.70 Although, in essence, a contradiction in terms like 
‘sovereign democracy’, its prescriptions have closely been followed by the 
Kremlin, i.e., the advice that the Russian government should ‘seriously 
work to protect Russian culture and the Russian people (those people who 
consider themselves Russians through their culture and language) outside 
Russia [and that it] maintain an active stance concerning the expansion of 
Russian businesses outside the country, including not only commerce but 
also the purchase of assets and opening of new businesses’.71
The application of the concept by the Russian government and corporations 
has been made possible by the confluence of four factors: (1) the availability 
of large sums of cash from the export of oil and gas; (2) the dependency 
of five of the six EaP countries on the import of fuel and electricity from 
Russia; (3) the government’s direct involvement in business deals abroad 
as a proprietor (e.g. the state oil corporation Rosneft) or acting behind 
his residence outside Moscow a few days prior to his visit to Belarus, ‘Medvedev 
Dismisses EU Eastern Partnership’, Homepage of EUbusiness, 23 November 2009. 
Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/russia-diplomacy.1lz (accessed 
on 11.2. 2011). See also: ‘Russia “Could join EU Eastern Partnership”’. Homepage of 
EUbusiness, 25 November 2009. Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/
russia-diplomacy.1mp (accessed on 11.2.2011).
70 Anatoly Chubais, ‘Missiya Rossii v XX veke’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 October 2003. 
Chubais is head of the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation. In the Yeltsin era, he 
served as head of the presidential administration (july 1996- March 1997) and first 
deputy prime minister in charge of the economy (March 1997-March 1998).
71 Roman Melnikov, ‘Can Russia be a Liberal Empire?’. Homepage of pravda.ru, 
14.10.2003. Available at: http://english.pravda.ru/history/14-10-2003/3893-
empire-0/# (accessed on 11.2. 2011). In fairness, Chubais’s prescriptions also 
included ‘active support for freedom and democracy outside Russia’. This policy 
advice, however, as amply demonstrated here, has not been heeded by the Kremlin.
44
Russia and Its Near Neighbourhood: Competition and Conflict with the EU
the scenes (e.g. South Stream) rather than a plethora of state and private 
businesses as in Europe (e.g. Nabucco); and (4) the absence of a coherent 
EU energy policy. As will be shown below, Moscow has amply used these 
levers in its relations with neighbouring countries. The tools of Russian 
policy, however, have not been limited to oil, gas and electricity. They have 
included other economic levers thus justifying the label of ‘economization’ 
of Russian policies in the near neighbourhood. In addition, Moscow 
has used political, military and cultural means up to and including the 
manipulation of ‘frozen conflicts’ for the assertion of its interests. This 
can be shown by focussing on Russia’s policies vis-à-vis each of the six 
countries individually.
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Belarus
EU-Russian competition over the internal system and foreign policy of the 
countries in its western and southern neighbourhood is clearly evident in 
Belarus. For Russia, that country is of crucial significance as part of its western 
geostrategic glacis; integral component of national defence; link between 
the Russian mainland and the Kaliningrad region; and transit corridor for 
its goods, above all oil and gas to Europe. In the perspective of the ruling 
elite in Moscow, Minsk acts as some sort of buffer that ‘protects’ Russia from 
Western influence. It regards Belarusians as part of the great Russian nation 
guided by ‘Slavic orthodox civilisation’. Belarus, as a consequence, has been 
subject to insistent Russian attempts at (re)integration. It forms part of the 
Russia-Belarus constitutional ‘Union’ and is a member of the CIS, the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EURASEC), the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan customs 
union and common economic space, the military-political Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and a joint air defence system.
When Russia’s opposition to EaP was first officially voiced, with foreign 
minister Lavrov, as quoted above, complaining that ‘We are accused of having 
spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to 
extend the EU’s sphere of influence?’, it was in part specifically because of the 
EU’s inclusion of Belarus in the EaP. Evidence of this was provided by Lavrov 
when he went on to charge that the Czech EU presidency and the European 
Commission were putting undue pressure on Belarus by suggesting that 
the country could be marginalised if it followed Russia in recognising the 
independence of Georgian breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
‘Is this promoting democracy or is it blackmail?’, he asked and provided the 
answer himself: ‘It is about pulling countries from the positions they want 
to take as sovereign states.’72 
The concern, it would appear, is well founded as the number of Belarusians 
who would vote for joining the EU exceeds the number of those who would 
72 ‘EU Expanding its “Sphere of Influence”’, op. cit. (fn. 8).
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support unification with Russia (42.2% to 34.9%).73 In order to forestall a 
westward drift of Belarus, therefore, Russia has also been willing heavily 
to subsidise the country. This concerns mainly energy. Belarus is critically 
dependent on Russian supplies. Approximately 90% of oil and 100% of 
gas used by Belarus originate in Russia. Chemical and petrochemical 
industries provide the lion’s share of its revenues. Up to 70% of its 
exports to the EU are made up by three types of product: petrochemical 
products, potash fertilizers and ferrous materials.74 Although Moscow 
changed policy towards its neighbours in 2004 and began to raise energy 
prices, subsidies are still lavishly extended to Belarus. In 2010, Russia 
was prepared to provide Belarus with 6.3 million tonnes of duty-free oil, 
enough for domestic consumption. Total Russian energy subsidies in 2010 
were estimated at US$4.6 billion (about 8% of Belarusian GDP), those on 
gas accounting for US$3.0 billion and for oil US$1.6 billion.75 
Recent Russian-Belarusian economic relations nevertheless have been rife with 
controversies. These have concerned allegedly unpaid gas bills, customs and 
tariff regimes, as well as incorrect documentation and certification, in the course 
of which Russia several times briefly stopped gas or oil supplies, as in january 
2004, january 2009 and january 2010, and, in july 2009, the importation of 
dairy products (‘milk war’). Whatever the specific circumstances, the common 
denominator of the rows lay in Russian attempts to gain a greater degree of 
leverage over Belarusian domestic politics, that is, over Lukashenko’s policies, 
73 According a September 2010 opinion conducted by the Independent Institute of 
Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS). Available at: http://www.iiseps.
org/09-10-06.html (accessed on 27 March 2011). This reference and the subsequent 
analysis of economic issues in Russian-Belarusian relations has benefitted from 
Alaksandr Papko and Alaksandr Łahviniec, ‘Unfinished Business: Challenges for 
Belarus on its Way to Democracy’, European View, Vol. 9, No. 2 (December 2010).
74 V. Protaskin, ‘V belorusskoy eksportnoy korzine– defitsit tovarov’, Zavtra tvoey strany, 
15 December 2009. Available at: http://www.zautra.by/art.php?sn_nid=5420&sn_
cat=17 (accessed 27.9.2010).
75 According to Belarusian political scientist Andrey Suzdal’tsev, ‘Neftyanoy itog’, 
politoboz.com. Available at: http://www.politoboz.com/content/neftyanoi-itog 
(accessed 2.4.2011).
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and control over the Belarus’ Europe-destined gas and oil pipelines, as well 
as Soviet-era oil-processing factories. Russia is particularly keen to take over 
the Belarusian gas transit company Beltransgaz, of which Gazprom already 
owns 50%. Lukashenko has, however, not been prepared to grant Russia the 
conditions it seeks. At the same time, he made overtures to the EU, conveying 
the notion that he did have an alternative to dependence on Russia.
Presumably as a warning signal in response, in july 2010 the Russian national 
television channel NTV featured a documentary on the Lukashenko regime 
under the title of The God Father. The movie chronicled human rights violations 
and electoral fraud committed in Belarus and portrayed Lukashenko as a 
dishonest, unscrupulous and ignorant dictator intent on holding onto power 
at all cost. It also asserted (in accordance with the above-mentioned facts) that 
Russian subsidies were the main reason for the ‘Belarus economic miracle’ 
of moderate growth and political stability. Unlike the policy of isolation and 
sanctions adopted by the EU from 1997 until 2008, however, the pressure 
exerted by the Kremlin was not directed towards democratisation but greater 
compliance with Russian economic demands.
The indications of a rift in Moscow-Minsk relations, the apparent differentiation 
of Lukashenko’s foreign policy, the release of some political prisoners and 
improvements in election legislation persuaded the EU to continue its new 
policy of ‘engagement’. In early November 2010, high-ranking officials of EU 
Member States travelled to Minsk, including chief of the German chancellor’s 
office Ronald Pofalla to open the Minsk Forum and Polish foreign minister 
Radosław Sikorski and German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle to talk 
to Lukashenko. The former attempted to convince the Belarusian leader that 
a meaningful improvement of EU-Belarusian relations could only occur if the 
upcoming (December 2010) presidential elections were to be free and fair. In 
that case, they promised, Belarus could count on receiving financial support 
in the coming three years in the amount of up to €3 billion.76 
76 ‘Westerwelle fordert von Weißrussland freie Wahlen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 3 November 2010, pp. 1-2.
48
Russia and Its Near Neighbourhood: Competition and Conflict with the EU
However, as it turned out, the electoral process was far from free and fair. 
More importantly, the regime reacted to the large-scale demonstrations 
against presumed electoral fraud and, apparently, less than expected 
support for the incumbent president, with violent repression, including 
severe beatings, arrest of opposition leaders, raids by the KGB on the homes 
and offices of those suspected of ties to the opposition and jail sentences. 
In january 2011, therefore, the EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels 
(re)imposed sanctions against Belarus in the form of an asset freeze and 
a visa ban on Belarusian government officials, including Lukashenko. At 
least for the short to medium term, this put an end to the EU policy of 
‘engagement’ and returned Belarus to Russia’s insistent embrace.
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Ukraine
The most important country in the EU-Russia competition over influence 
in Eastern Europe is Ukraine. This is due to its vast territory (603.628 km², 
the largest contiguous country on the European continent); its strategic 
location, including as a transit country for Russian gas to Europe (80% of 
Gazprom’s shipments for EU-Europe flow through Ukrainian pipelines); 
the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet until, according to the 
April 2010 Kharkov agreement, at least 2024 (see below); the size of its 
population (46 million inhabitants); its numerous Russian minority (17% 
of the population overall, with heavy concentrations in the east of the 
country and in the Crimea); a long history of common statehood; Russian 
as the lingua franca in most of the country, including in the capital; and 
widespread availability of Russian television programs, providing Russia 
with a significant degree of ‘soft power’. 
The use of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ instruments and the failure of the Orange 
Revolution to live up to its promises resulted in what seemed impossible 
in the euphoria of the election of Yushchenko as president and the 
appointment of Tymoshenko as prime minister in 2005: the election of 
the proven perpetrator of electoral fraud, Blue competitor Yanukovich as 
president in February 2010. In conjunction with the dismantling of the 
territorial integrity of Georgia and the humiliation of Saakashvili in the 
brief Russo-Georgian war, the challenges of the ‘colour revolutions’, the 
CDC and GUAM for all practical purposes had dissipated. 
The new president and his government under Mykola Azarov may aver 
that the European orientation remained Ukraine’s foreign policy priority 
but in practice, in domestic politics, they have embarked on a course that 
restores elements of the ancien régime (‘Kuchmaisation’) and the political 
system of their neighbour (‘Putinisation’); in foreign policy, they have 
returned to a ‘multi-vector’ or ‘balanced’ approach between the EU and 
Russia (with NATO membership clearly ruled out). 
50
Russia and Its Near Neighbourhood: Competition and Conflict with the EU
Russia’s policies are designed to tilt the balance towards the east. In terms 
of persuading Kiev to join the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan customs union, 
whose acceptance by Ukraine would be incompatible with the conclusion 
of an agreement with the EU to create a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA), and some other proposals to deepen economic 
integration, it has been unsuccessful. It has been quite successful, however, 
in using the energy lever to strengthen its strategic position in the country; 
to limit EU influence; and to enhance Kiev’s dependency on Moscow. This 
became apparent, first, in the indignation with which Russia reacted to 
the March 2009 EU-Ukraine agreement to the effect that Brussels would 
provide $3.5 billion to help finance the modernization of Ukraine’s gas 
pipeline system, with an independent company to take over the pipeline 
system and set transit fees. Notwithstanding the assurances by the then 
Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, that the EU planned ‘to work 
together with and not against Gapzrom’ and that it was because of ‘the 
gas deliveries disruption [earlier in the year] that we started to work first 
with Ukraine’,77 Putin warned: ‘If Russia’s interests are being ignored, then 
we will be forced to revise our relationship with our partners. We really do 
not want things to reach that level. But the main point, which I would like 
to emphasize, is that trying to solve the problem of increasing gas supplies, 
gas which is Russian, is meaningless. We want this signal to be heard.’78 The 
warnings apparently were effective. Nothing has come of the EU-Ukraine 
infrastructure modernisation initiative.
Instead, the prospects for comprehensive reforms in the energy sector 
and cooperation with the EU in the European Energy Community were 
set back by the agreements concluded in April 2010 between presidents 
Yanukovich and Medvedev as well as in the same month between Gazprom 
77 ‘Putin Condemns EU Deal on Ukraine Gas Pipelines’. Homepage of the Russian 
English-language TV Channel Russia Today, 24 March 2009. Available at: http://
www.russiatoday.ru/Business/2009-03-24/Putin_condemns_EU_deal_on_ 
Ukraine_gas_pipelines__.html (accessed on 11.2.2011) (italics not in the original).
78 Ibid. Putin added a conciliatory note, saying that ‘we are ready for constructive work 
with all of our partners.’
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and the Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz. In exchange for Kiev’s consent to 
the prolongation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s basing rights in Sevastopol 
beyond the 2017 expiration date, until 2042, Russia granted a discount of 
$100 if the price for Ukraine is $333 per 1,000 cubic meters or above 
or 30% if the price is under $333.79 The agreement also provides for gas 
volumes which exceed likely Ukrainian domestic requirements, allowing 
the country to re-export gas. The amount the country is likely to save as 
a result has been estimated at about $40 billion over the next decade.80 
The combination of cheap gas and excessive volumes is likely to mitigate 
pressure for comprehensive reform of the gas sector. Furthermore, Russia’s 
ambitions for gaining a greater degree of control over the Ukrainian 
economy (and politics) were evident also in supplementary agreements 
concerning the creation of a joint company to link Ukraine’s Antonov 
aircraft plant with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation and for Russian 
participation in building new Ukrainian nuclear facilities in Khmelnitsky 
and Kharkov as well as in the Russian proposal to merge gas giant Gazprom 
with Ukraine’s state energy firm Naftogaz. 
79 For the documents on the April 2010 Russian-Ukrainian gas-for-basing-rights 
agreements see ‘Dogovor Yanukovicha i Medvedeva o bazirovanii flota do 2042 
goda’ and ‘Kharkovskoe dopolnenie k gazomu kontraktu’, Ukrayinska pravda, 22 
April 2010. Available at: http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/archives/date_22042010/ 
(accessed on 1.4.2010).
80 ‘Ukraine and Russia’, Economist, 31 April - 6 May 2010.
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Moldova 
Neither Moldova nor the breakaway entity of Transnistria are per se of 
much importance to Russia. Its geopolitical location may be of some 
interest to neighbours such as Romania and Ukraine but it is landlocked 
and does not have a common border with Russia. Its population, including 
that of the separatist republic, amounts to less then 4 million people; 
600,000 to one million Moldovan citizens (almost 25% of the population) 
are working abroad, many of them illegally; its economy is small (GDP 
estimated at $5.4 billion, which is about 40% of the size in the Soviet era), 
vulnerable and dependent on Russia; in terms of GDP per capita (about 
$1,500), it ranks as the poorest country in Europe and 4.5 times lower 
than the world average.81 
All this applies equally to Russian interests in Transnistria. Russia’s 14th 
army under General Lebed (to his later regret) was instrumental in the 
achievement of de facto independence by the ‘Pridenestrovian Moldovan 
Republic’ (PMR) in the course of a brief war between separatists and 
the Moldovan army in 1992. Since then, contrary to commitments 
undertaken by Moscow at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit to withdraw 
its troops, equipment and ammunition by 2002, it has maintained a 
force of up to 1,200 men and kept 20,000 tons of ammunition and 
thereby provided a constant guarantee of the PMR’s (unrecognised) 
‘independence’. This slender ribbon of territory wedged between ‘core’ 
Moldova and Ukraine covers a mere 1,607 square miles (less than half the 
size of Abkhazia and about one third of that of Kosovo). Its population 
has shrunk dramatically, from about 750 000 at the time of the split from 
Moldova to an estimated 410,000 people today.82 Its economy survives 
81 Some of the data according to ‘Moldova Country Report: GDP Data and GDP 
Forecasts. Economic, Financial and Trade Information’, Global Finance [n.d.]. 
Available at: http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/219-moldova-gdp-
country-report.html#axzz1IHCj2LPm (accessed on 1.4. 2010).
82 Vladimir Fomenko, ‘The Demographic Situation in Transdniestria in Conditions 
of Unresolved Conflict’, in: D. Matveev, G. Şelari, E. Bobcova, B. Cseke (eds.), 
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on a mixture of Russian subsidies, legal trade, illegal trade (smuggling) 
and money laundering.
Russia has maintained the Transnistrian economy by supplying energy 
at much lower rates compared to what is provided to Moldova: Gazprom 
is charging Transnistria US$60 per thousand cubic meters (three times 
less than what it demands from Moldovan customers). Nevertheless, 
the PMR has accumulated an unpaid bill to Gazprom in the amount of 
US$2.5 billion.83 Russian subsidies are extended not only in the form of 
lower energy prices and unpaid bills for gas but also as grants and loans, 
including ‘humanitarian aid’ such as transfers from the Russian state 
budget to the PMR pension fund. 
The overall losses to the Russian state as majority shareholder of Gazprom 
and the Russian taxpayer may be small. However, Russian big business has 
profited significantly through the process of privatisation of PMR state 
owned enterprises since the year 2000 – and so have Russian government 
officials through their involvement in and control of Russian business.
This may be one of the reasons explaining the fact that, since the failure 
of the ‘Kozak plan’ in November 2003, no serious Russian initiative for 
conflict resolution has been put forward.84 Another constant feature has 
Moldova–Transdniestria: Working Together for a Prosperous Future. Social Aspects, 
‘Cu drag’ SRL, Chisinau, 2009, p. 139.
83 Moldovagaz is Moldova’s national gas operator. On 24 March 2011 Moldova and 
Russia reached an agreement to separate the part of the company situated on the 
territory of the breakaway region of Transnistria. The PMR government will take 
over Moldovagaz’s debt to Gazprom, which stands at US$2.5 billion. The agreement 
legalises the existing de facto division of the gas infrastructure between Chisinau 
and Tiraspol, while at the same time releasing Chisinau from its legal liability for 
gas debts accumulated by Transnistria. For this information as well as analysis see 
‘Dividing up Moldovagaz and Moldova’s Gas Debts’, Centre for Eastern Studies, 
Analytical Newsletter, No. 12, 30 March 2011. Available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/EastWeek_247.pdf (accessed on 1.4.2011).
84 The ‘Kozak plan’ refers to a proposal aimed at a solution of the Transnistrian 
‘frozen conflict’ submitted in mid-November 2003 by the then deputy head of 
the presidential administration and a close ally of Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Kozak. 
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been Moscow’s aversion to any role the EU might want to assume for 
peacekeeping or as a guarantor of any future settlement. Contrary to 
repeated commitments by the EU and Russia to embark on ‘practical co-
operation on crisis management […] and in the settlement of regional 
conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders’,85 such 
cooperation does not exist. Concerning the settlement of the Transnistria 
problem, it was chancellor Merkel who took the initiative during her 
meeting with president Medvedev at Meseberg Palace (near Berlin) in 
june 2010 and again during the German-Russian inter-governmental 
meeting in Yekaterinburg in july of the same year. As an incentive for 
Russian concessions, the German chancellor suggested creating a high-
level EU-Russia Political and Security Policy Committee for consultations 
and decision-making, singling out the Transnistria conflict for possible 
joint diplomatic efforts. However, whereas the Russian president agreed 
to the idea of establishing a security committee, to date he has offered no 
concession or compromise on the conflict. 
The plan provided for a united asymmetric federal Moldavian state with three 
major entities (Moldova, Transnistria and Gaguzia) and two houses of parliament. 
Problems were disproportionate representation with respect to population figures, 
the risk of stalemate in government decision-making and the presence of Russian 
forces for 25 years. To the apparent rage of Putin, who had made plans to travel 
to Chisinau for the signature of the memorandum, Moldovan president Voronin 
rejected the plan.
85 Road Map for the Common Space of External Security, adopted in May 2005 at the 
Moscow EU-Russia summit for the creation of one of the four Common Spaces. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/ eu_russia/road_
maps_en.pdf (accessed on 1.4.2011).
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The Southern Caucasus 
The same patterns of Russian policies directed towards the maintenance of 
a ‘sphere of influence’ and curtailment of Western, including EU, influence 
that could be observed in the Western CIS states are evident also in the 
Southern Caucasus. The region was put under Czarist control in the 18th 
and 19th century in the course of imperial expansion. The attempts by its 
constituent parts, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, to gain independent 
statehood after World War I were suppressed by the Bolsheviks. Given 
the enormous differences in historical development, geography, culture, 
ethnicity, language and religion, their merger into one republic, the 
Transcaucasian SFSR in 1922, was reversed in 1936. The three republics, 
in the then existing borders, became independent after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.
In Russian perceptions, the region retains great strategic importance. 
Through the ‘imperial road’ (from Vladikavkas via Tbilisi to Yerevan) 
and along the coastal roads (from Sochi via Sukhumi, Poti and Batumi, 
as well as from Makhachkala to Baku) it constitutes a vital transit area to 
Turkey, Iran and further beyond in the Middle East. That importance may 
have diminished along two of the three major axes, not least because of 
(ill advised) Russian policies, including the closure of the Imperial Road, 
as well as of the road and rail links between Abkhazia and the main part 
of Georgia but it has by no means vanished. 
In contrast, the economic utility of the region for Russia has to some 
extent declined. Baku’s oil and gas resources are no longer that important 
for Moscow, and they pale in comparison with those of Russia proper and 
Central Asia, notably Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The size of Russian 
ethnic minorities has also diminished significantly because of large-scale 
emigration after the three countries had gained independence. What is 
driving the Kremlin’s policies, then? Certainly, considerations of economic 
gain of Russian state and private oligarchs through the acquisition of 
assets but also less substantive, more subjective considerations such as 
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nostalgia for lost imperial greatness; inability or unwillingness to accept 
small countries as equals; and, above all, prevention of other international 
actors, notably the United States and NATO but also the EU, from filling 
a putative ‘power vacuum’.86 
Such motives and motivations are particularly evident in the case of Georgia. 
Shortly after the Rose Revolution (see above) and after a brief interval of 
Russia’s assistance to Tbilisi in March 2004 to help in the reestablishment 
of Georgian authority in Adzharia, the relations between Tbilisi and 
Moscow deteriorated sharply until the Russian military intervention in 
August 2008. As the EU-sponsored investigation of the war concluded, 
the shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces during the night 
of 7 to 8 August may have marked the beginning of the large-scale armed 
conflict in Georgia, ‘yet it was only the culminating point of a long period 
of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents’.87 
This is not the place to chronicle the process of escalation that led to war. 
What is pertinent in the present context, however, is, first, to convey the 
intensity of the rage felt (or pretended) in Moscow about the Georgian 
defection and the length to which the Kremlin was prepared to go to force 
Tbilisi to abandon its pro-European and pro-Atlantic course and, second, 
to clarify that Russia was determined to maintain its position in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and prevent their reintegration into Georgia. One of 
the examples underlying the first purpose is the sequence of events that 
began in September 2006 with the arrest of several Russian officers of the 
GRU military intelligence for suspected espionage – a step to which Tbilisi 
was legally entitled. Putin, in response, accused the Georgian leadership 
of having adopted a policy of ‘state terrorism’88 and of following, ‘both 
86 For Putin’s view on this, see above, p. 11 and fn. 16.
87 International Fact Finding Mission on the War in Georgia (Tagliavini Report), 
September 2009. Available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/20427542/Tagliavini-
Report-Georgia-Volume-I (accessed on 2.4.2011).
88 ‘Moskva i Tbilisi na poroge kholodnoi voiny’, Pervyi kanal – novosti, 1 October 
2006. Putin’s charge of ‘state terrorism’ was carried by the First Channel of Russian 
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inside the country and in the international arena, the policy of [Stalin’s 
secret police chief] Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.’89 Defence minister Ivanov 
claimed that ‘banditry’ in Georgia had become government policy; the 
situation in the country were ‘reminiscent of 1937’.90 In rapid succession, 
Russia was taking steps and adopting postures usually associated with 
impending military intervention, including the withdrawal of embassy 
staff; deportations of ethnic Georgians from Russia; closure of the state 
borders; rupture of road, rail, sea, and air communications; stop of postal 
services and money transfers; orders of ‘shoot to kill’ to Russia’s military 
forces in the country in response to Georgian ‘provocations’; and the 
announcement of naval manoeuvres off the Georgian coast.
Concerning the second purpose, in April 2008 then still president Putin 
instructed Russia’s ministries and other government bodies to work 
directly with their counterparts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia on a full 
range of bilateral cooperation activities. These included recognition of 
legal acts issued by Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities; recognition of 
entities registered under Abkhaz and South Ossetian ‘laws’; provision of 
legal assistance on matters of civil and criminal law directly to Abkhaz and 
South Ossetian authorities and residents (most of whom had previously 
been turned into purported Russian citizens through ‘passportization’). 
The presidential decree also envisaged the drafting of further Russian 
government initiatives on the ‘economic development of these two 
republics’ and ‘protection of Russian citizens’ there. As it turned out, 
‘economic development’ meant acceleration of Russian takeovers of 
property and launching of construction work in Abkhazia ahead of the 
Winter Olympic Games to be held in nearby Sochi; the ‘protection of 
TV but deleted on the Kremlin’s website. 
89 At a session of the Russian national security council on 1 October 2006, kremlin.
ru, 1 October 2006. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2006/10/01/0000_
type63378_111833.shtml (accessed on 1.4.2011).
90 ‘Rossiia trebuet osvobozhdeniia voennykh v Gruzii i vvodit otvetnye mery’, Agentstvo 
natsionalnykh novostei, 28 September 2006.
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Russian citizens’ served as justification for the deployment of additional 
Russian troops and, later, military intervention; and the presidential decree 
on the upgrading of the legal status of the two republics was merely an 
intermediary stage to the full diplomatic recognition that Russia was to 
extend to the separatist republics after the war.91 
From the Russian perspective, the ‘frozen conflicts’ in Georgia have 
thereby been solved. Indeed, it is difficult to foresee conditions that could 
induce the Russian government to rescind its recognition of the two 
separatist entities. Under these circumstances, the fundamentally different 
approaches to economic and political development, as well as regional 
stability, by the EU (ENP and EaP, notably the latter’s emphasis on regional 
cooperation) and Russia (support and protection of Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian sovereignty) will continue to run at cross-purposes.92 
Perhaps to a lesser extent than the diverging positions in Georgia, the conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is a final example 
of EU-Russian policy differences in the common neighbourhood. This 
‘frozen conflict’ clearly hampers economic development of the two countries 
as large sums are being spent on the military. In oil-wealthy Azerbaijan, 
defence spending has grown by an average of 50% every year since 2003. 
In 2011, it will account for one fifth of the country’s total public spending, 
and more than the entire Armenian budget. But Armenia too has increased 
its defence expenditures and weaponry, the latter with help from Russia.93 
91 Much of this was accurately predicted by Vladimir Socor, ‘Russia Moves Toward 
Open Annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 74, 
18 April 2008. Available at: Vol. 5, No. 74 (18 April 2008). Available at: http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33560 (accessed 
on 7.4.2011).
92 Under these very circumstances, the EU’s (civilian) Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 
operating along the borders of ‘core’ Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia can 
only serve to maintain the status quo.
93 Data according to ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Still just About Frozen’, Economist, 7 
March 2011. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/03/
nagorno-karabakh_conflict (accessed on 7.4.2011).
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Regional economic development, too, is severely constrained given the fact 
that the borders between the two countries, as well as between Armenia and 
Turkey, are closed; Azeri access to its large exclave Nakhichevan is blocked; 
and Baku has successfully insisted in Ankara that the normalisation of 
Armenian-Turkish relations is a two-track process that must go hand in 
hand with resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Regional political 
cooperation hardly exists, and security is imperilled. As the August 2008 
Russo-Georgian war demonstrated, frozen conflicts can turn hot very 
quickly.94 Ceasefire violations have risen significantly in 2010; in total, 3,000 
people have been killed in skirmishes along the boundary line since the May 
1994 ceasefire took effect. Both countries have stepped up their bellicose 
rhetoric. Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s president, warned of war in at least nine 
separate speeches in 2010, and has shown no sign of letting up this year. 
His Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan, has strongly underlined his 
country’s readiness to repel any attacks. Recent military exercises in both 
countries suggest that this is not empty bravado.
The self-ascribed position of the Kremlin is that of an honest broker. Several 
bilateral talks have taken place and, since November 2008, Medvedev has 
hosted a total of five meetings between Sargsyan and Aliyev. But how 
honest a mediator is Russia? How resolution-driven are its mediation 
efforts? Finally and most importantly in the context of the present inquiry, 
how much cooperation with the EU (and the OSCE) does the Kremlin 
envisage, and how acceptable to Russia would be the role of the EU as a 
guarantor of a settlement? 
It is doubtful that Moscow is really interested in a comprehensive conflict 
resolution. A settlement would mean losing important leverage in the 
region. Moscow is playing on and with both sides, giving and taking from 
Armenia and Azerbaijan interchangeably, although the tilt is clearly in 
Armenia’s favour. That country is Moscow’s only ally in the region, and 
94 Data and analysis until the end of this paragraph draw on ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh 
Conflict’, op. cit. (fn. 93).
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it very much values its military, economic and political presence there. 
In August 2010, therefore, it concluded a far-reaching agreement with 
Yerevan that will prolong Russia’s military basing rights by 24 years, 
to 2044; upgrade the mission of its troops headquartered in the city of 
Gyumri; commit Russia to supplying its regional ally with ‘modern and 
compatible weaponry and special military hardware’; and go beyond 
‘functions stemming from the interests of the Russian Federation […] 
to protect Armenia’s security together with Armenian Army units’.95 
During his visit to Yerevan, where the agreement was signed, Medvedev 
underlined the gravity of Russia’s commitment. Asked whether Russia 
would intervene in a conflict involving Armenia, Medvedev stated that 
‘Russia takes its obligations to its allies very seriously’.96
At this stage in the international efforts at conflict resolution, however, 
pressure on Armenian government rather than demonstrative increase in 
support would be required. The basis of a solution surely are the Madrid 
Principles presented by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs (France, Russia, 
and the United States) to the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers 
in November 2007 and updated in 2009 at the urging of the presidents of 
the three co-chairs and clarifications by the government of Azerbaijan.97 
95 The agreement is in form of amendments to a 1995 treaty regulating Russian 
military basing rights in the country. The amendments were signed during president 
Medvedev’s visit to Armenia 19-20 August 2010. For details, including the quotes 
presented here, see ‘New Russian-Armenian Defence Pact “Finalized”’, rferl.org, 15 
August 2010. ‘Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/New_RussianArmenian_ 
Defense_Pact_Finalized/2128266.html (accessed on 8.4. 2011). Emil Danielyan, 
‘Armenia Displays Sophisticated Air Defence Systems’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 
8, No. 13, 19 january 2011. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_
cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37381 (accessed on 9.4.2011).
96 ‘Russia Extends, Increases Military Presence in Armenia’, acus.org, 20 August 2010. 
Available at: http://www.acus.org/natosource/russia-extends-increases-military-
presence-armenia (accessed 8.4.2011).
97 The outline of the phased process and its analysis as provided by Vladimir Socor, 
‘Azerbaijan Clarifies View of Baku-Ankara-Yerevan Normalization Process’, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 53, 17 March 2011. Available at: http://www.jamestown.
org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37658&cHash=0ca27e52f8
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The principles envisage a phased, rather than a package solution to the 
conflict, the first phase providing for the Armenian troops’ withdrawal 
from some of the districts situated in Azerbaijan’s interior, abutting on three 
sides on the Armenian-populated Karabakh region. Withdrawal of troops 
and re-opening of borders would proceed gradually as parallel processes. 
This first phase would include the provision of security guarantees, post-
conflict reconstruction in Azerbaijani territories vacated by Armenian 
forces, and the return of Azeri expellees to their homes there. Along with 
this, cross-border trade and transportation between Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Turkey would go ahead. Karabakh’s Armenian population could also 
resume economic and social contacts with its Azeri neighbours as part 
of post-conflict normalization. This phase would be is envisaged to be 
completed within five years. The second phase would involve withdrawal 
of Armenian forces from remaining areas of Azerbaijan, return of Azeri 
expellees there, international security guarantees for the Armenian 
population, and negotiations on Karabakh’s final status. Yerevan, however, 
wants Ankara to re-open the land border with Armenia unconditionally, 
de-coupled from the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan’s 
districts surrounding Karabakh, thereby de facto isolating Azerbaijan. 
It also rules out Turkish participation in any negotiation process on 
Karabakh, notwithstanding the fact that Turkey is a member of the OSCE 
Minsk Group.
Russia’s increased support means that the incentive for Armenia to make 
concessions has been diminished. It could be argued that pressure from 
Washington on Yerevan is also lacking and that the EU is conspicuously 
absent in the negotiating process and as a possible guarantor of a settlement. 
The latter, however, has much to do with the fact that the Kremlin does not 
welcome such a role and insists that ‘Russia’s task as the largest and most 
powerful state in the region […] consists of securing peace and order’.98
a8779c988fd09aa2db2776 (accessed on 8.4.2011).
98 President Medvev during his visit to Yerevan; see ‘Russia Extends, Increases Military 
Presence in Armenia’, op. cit. (fn. 96). 
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Conclusions and Prospects
The main and subsidiary propositions and hypotheses as stated in the 
Introduction have been validated, leading to the following conclusions:
1. The Russian government – more broadly, the Russian foreign policy 
and international security establishment – has regarded ‘its’ near 
neighbourhood, its ‘Near Abroad’, as a Russian sphere of influence. This 
perception is correlated with the claim that Russia had ‘special rights’ 
in that space, as well as certain obligations, including the ‘protection of 
Russian-speaking minorities’. 
2. This position evolved after a brief interval of ‘Euroatlanticist’ policies 
and integration into a common space ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok’ 
under Yeltsin’s foreign minister Kozyrev. It was replaced by the idea that 
Russia had a ‘separate’, continental ‘Eurasian’ identity and, as the largest 
and most powerful country on post-Soviet space, a ‘leading role’ to play 
in that region. Under president Putin, that claim was strengthened by the 
proclaimed aim of restoring to Russia the status of a ‘Great Power’. 
3. From the perspective of the Russian power elite, since the CIS area is not 
an autonomous or independent part of the international system but an 
area in which Russia has ‘special’, ‘vital’ or ‘privileged’ interests, its policies 
there should be conceived as lying on a continuum between Russian 
domestic politics and foreign policy, or as an extension of internal politics. 
The consequence of this is that domestic ordering principles and priorities 
tend to be projected to the near neighbourhood. Vice versa, developments 
in that area are perceived to affect the Russian domestic domain.
4. The interconnection between Russian domestic politics and policies 
is of critical importance for comprehending EU-Russian relations 
in the common neighbourhood because of the nature of the ‘Putin 
system’. Its central features are, politically, the concentration of power 
in a small circle of leaders, lack of transparency in decision making, an 
authoritarian and populist style of government, absence of checks and 
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balances, managed elections by means of the utilisation of government 
resources for the ruling party in parliamentary elections and for 
the closed circle’s preferred candidate in presidential elections, and 
reintroduction of central control over the regions; in the economic realm, 
correspondingly, state control over ‘strategic’ resources, reestablishment 
of political control over the ‘oligarchs’ (as witnessed by the trials and 
convictions of Khodorkovsky), gross abuse of power and influence by 
government officials for personal gain, i.e., wide-spread corruption; 
in the legal domain, pervasive ‘legal nihilism’, the absence of a law-
based state, and control over the judiciary by the executive branch of 
government; in the social sphere, erection of barriers for grass-roots 
movements to establish themselves as political parties and take part 
in the political process, curtailment of the freedom of the media, and 
limitation of the activities of non-governmental organisations.
5. The path Russia has embarked upon under Putin thus sharply contradicts 
EU purposes and principles, namely, that EU-Russia relations should be 
based ‘on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common 
heritage of European civilisation’, the achievement of ‘a stable, open and 
pluralistic democracy governed by the rule of law’, ‘a prosperous market 
economy’ with fair competition, and ‘civil society’ that gives scope for 
the activity of non-governmental institutions. Given this contradiction, 
it follows that the Putin system and the EU’s aim of ‘integrating Russia 
into a common European economic and social space’ are mutually 
exclusive and that the reality of the EU-Russia relationship in the 
common European neighbourhood has not been that of a ‘strategic 
partnership’ and co-operation but of competition.
6. This can be demonstrated, in particular, regarding the respective 
approaches to the possible solution of the ‘frozen conflicts’. In principle, 
the EU and Russia have committed themselves – e.g., in the ‘Road 
Map for the Common Space of External Security’ – to cooperate in 
the establishment of a ‘greater Europe without dividing lines and based 
on common values’; in ‘the development of principles and modalities 
64
Russia and Its Near Neighbourhood: Competition and Conflict with the EU
for joint approaches in crisis management’; and ‘in the settlement of 
regional conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian 
borders’. In practice, however, Russia has used the conflicts over 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh as levers 
to retain influence over the domestic and foreign policy orientation of 
the countries concerned. 
7. Perceptions underpin the reality of competition in the ‘regions adjacent 
to EU and Russian borders’. It may be difficult to separate genuine from 
instrumental perception but judging both from the rhetoric and the 
policies conducted, the conclusion is warranted that the Russian power 
elite is still wedded to what in international relations theory is called the 
Realist School, that is, that international relations are to be understood 
as some kind of ‘grand chessboard’ in which ‘zero-sum games’ (the loss 
of one side is the gain of the other) are played among sovereign state 
actors; where the ‘balance of power’ – of ‘hard power’ at that –matters; 
and where no ‘power vacuum’ could exist. The perceptions of the 
Russian foreign and international security establishment conform to 
such stereotypes, including and above all in relation to the CIS area – 
as witnessed by Putin’s apodictic assertion that if Russia did not fill any 
actual or potential vacuum in this region, ‘other, more active, states’ (sic) 
would ‘resolutely’ step in to fill it. 
8. The height of Russia’s concerns to lose the competition with the EU came 
with the ‘colour revolutions’, the two summit meetings of the ‘Community 
for Democratic Choice and the attempts by the government of George W. 
Bush to offer Ukraine and Georgia a NATO Membership Action Plan. The 
perceived dangers of a democratic and European choice of the neighbouring 
countries, however, dissipated. In part, they were averted as a result of the 
liberal employment of ‘hard power’, in part as a result of, from the Kremlin’s 
perspective, favourable domestic developments in the region. 
 In Ukraine, the collapse of the Orange coalition, the rift between 
president and prime minister, paralysis of government, widespread 
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corruption and the effects of the global financial crisis combined to 
lead to the re-election of Yanukovich as president. This development 
has led to the restoration of more or less normal government business, 
including in its dealing with the EU, but at the expense of a restoration 
of features of the ancien régime (‘Kuchmaisation’) and that of the system 
in neighbouring Russia (‘Putinisation’).
 In Belarus, despite some improvements, the presidential elections of 
19 December were again marred by manipulation and falsification, 
with Lukashenko allegedly receiving about 80% of the vote, leading 
to mass demonstrations of protesters to which the regime responded 
with violent repression. As a consequence, as witnessed by the re-
imposition of sanctions, the EU’s ‘strategy of engagement’ has failed, and 
the prospects of the government in Minsk becoming an active partner 
in the Eastern Partnership have dimmed.
 In Moldova, Moscow has retained leverage with the help of the 
manipulation of the conflict over Transnistria. Domestic developments, 
too, have helped to retain influence there: The ruling four-party Alliance 
for European Integration was unsuccessful in its attempt to break the 
deadlock of the country being without a full-time president by means 
of a referendum (to replace the system of electing the president by a 
three-fifths majority in parliament). The November 2010 parliamentary 
elections again failed to overcome the political impasse, the two opposing 
camps – the communists and the pro-Europeans – again falling short 
of the threshold needed (61 seats) to elect a president. 
 Georgia, as the lone exception of the Six – despite authoritarian tendencies 
of its president, unfair usage of government funds for electoral purposes 
and limitations on the freedom of the press – remains solidly on a pro-
European and pro-Atlantic course. However, Saakashvili’s ill-considered 
attempt to reassert control in South Ossetia by military means has led 
to the de facto loss of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and severely 
constrained Georgia’s freedom of action.
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 The same applies to Armenia which, because of the conflict with 
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and the failure of the ‘football 
diplomacy’ to lead to normalisation and the opening of the borders with 
Turkey, is crucially dependent on Russian security guarantees, military 
assistance and political support. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, falls far 
short of democratic standards envisaged by the EU and it, too, must be 
careful not to confront Russia so as not to risk losing Moscow’s role as 
a mediator in the conflict with Armenia.
What, in conclusion, may be the prospects of the EU-Russian relationship 
in the common neighbourhood? The probability of competition turning 
to cooperation in that area is low. Several schemes of regional cooperation 
(e.g. the Northern Dimension, Kaliningrad, regional and cross-border 
projects) with the participation of EU Member States do exist; these are, 
however, unlikely in the foreseeable future to be replicated in relation to 
the regions of ‘privileged’ Russian interests. The more relaxed attitude 
that Russian officials now display vis-à-vis the ENP’s eastern dimension, 
the EaP, is mainly predicated upon the realisation that the likely impact 
of ENP and EaP on the domestic and foreign policy orientation of the six 
countries concerned is likely to be small and that Russia still retains good 
cards in the competitive game with the EU.
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